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Provocation as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse
Mitchell N. Berman *
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The partial defense of provocation provides that a person who kills in the
heat of passion brought on by legally adequate provocation is guilty of
manslaughter rather than murder. It traces back to the twelfth century, and exists
today, in some form, in almost every U.S. state and other common law
jurisdictions. But long history and wide application have not produced agreement
on the rationale for the doctrine. To the contrary, the search for a coherent and
satisfying rationale remains among the main occupations of criminal law theorists.
The dominant scholarly view holds that provocation is best explained and
defended as a partial excuse, on the grounds that the killer’s inflamed emotional
state so compromised his ability to conform his conduct to the demands of reason
and law as to render him substantially less blameworthy for his conduct. In
contrast, a small minority of scholars have maintained, without significant
argumentative support, that provocation is best understood as a partial
justification, on the ground that the provoked killing is less wrongful than is an
unprovoked killing, ceteris paribus. Recently, other commentators have argued
that provocation mitigation is neither partial excuse nor partial justification.
Against all of these familiar positions, we argue that partial excuse and
partial justification are necessary and sufficient conditions for provocation
manslaughter. In our view, an intentional killing deserves to be punished and
labeled as manslaughter rather than murder only when, because of provocation,
this particular killing is significantly less wrongful than is the standard intentional
killing and when, because of the actor’s partial lack of control, he is less
blameworthy for committing an act that remains all-things-considered wrongful.
In elaborating and defending our account, we rebut the oft-repeated but rarely
challenged propositions that justification and excuse (even in partial forms) are
mutually exclusive, and that the very notion of partial justification is incoherent.
We also draw forth implications for how the sentencing ranges for murder and for
manslaughter should be related.
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INTRODUCTION
The partial defense of provocation provides that a person who intentionally
kills another in the heat of passion brought on by legally adequate provocation is
guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. The doctrine has both deep roots and
widespread limbs: the influence of provocation on the common law of homicide
has been traced back to the Twelfth Century, and some version of the provocation
defense is part of the law in almost every U.S. state and other common law
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jurisdictions.1 But long history and wide application have not translated into
agreement on the rationale for the doctrine.
The search for a rationale for the provocation defense has resulted in a
scholarly debate lasting several decades, but yet to bear satisfactory fruit. The
provocation debate is a scion of a broader discussion concerning the character of
defenses that has consumed a generation of criminal law theorists. Defenses are
generally classified as either justifications or excuses. While the precise nature of
the distinction is disputed, justification defenses are generally said to apply when
the actor’s conduct is not wrongful, whereas excuse defenses are said to apply
when the actor engages in wrongful conduct but is not liable, particularly because
not blameworthy.2 Self-defense is usually considered a paradigm example of a
justification defense, and insanity a paradigm of excuse. Roughly speaking, a
person who kills in self-defense has done something of which the law does not
disapprove, while an insane killer is considered not responsible for his or her
actions and therefore not properly blamed or punished for them.
Provocation differs from the examples of self-defense and insanity in
several ways, and as a result has proven particularly obdurate to classification.
First, a successful plea of provocation does not preclude a conviction for the
killing. Rather, the offense is reduced from murder to manslaughter, with the
available punishment options reduced accordingly. While self-defense and
insanity are complete defenses, provocation is a partial defense. The debate about
provocation’s rationale has therefore focused on whether provocation is a partial
justification or a partial excuse. By analogy, partial justifications would apply
when an actor’s conduct was less wrongful than if justifying conditions were not
present, but was still, on balance, wrongful. Partial excuses would apply when the
actor was less blameworthy than if excusing conditions were not present, but still
liable for some punishment.
Second, some elements of the doctrine—such as the requirement of
“adequate” provocation—suggest that provocation should be treated as a partial
justification. Other elements—notably the need for “heat of passion”—point
towards a rationale of partial excuse. Like European zoologists confronted with
the warm-blooded but egg-laying platypus for the first time, criminal scholars have
struggled to produce a coherent rationale that adequately captures those features of
the provocation doctrine that seem to pull in opposite directions.

1
The majority of U.S. states retain the common law doctrine of provocation. A substantial
minority of states have replaced common law provocation with a partial defense based on the
Model Penal Code’s analogue of killings resulting from “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.” The relationship between the partial defense at common law and under the Model
Penal Code is discussed in Part I. In several U.S. states, such as Illinois and Texas, provocation
results in a lower category of murder rather than manslaughter. See ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(1)
(defining provocation as second degree murder); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(1)(d) (defining
provocation as a felony of the second degree).
2
This brief statement of the distinction is, of course, unrefined. For example, to say that conduct is
not (criminally) wrong does not entail that it involves no moral wrong. See Mitchell N. Berman,
Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2003); Douglas N. Husak, Partial
Defenses, 11 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 167, 170 (1998). We will address the distinction in greater detail
in the body of our Article.
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Scholars have responded in several ways. The dominant contemporary
view is that provocation is best understood as some version of partial excuse. A
small minority of scholars have claimed to the contrary that provocation
manslaughter is, or should be, some kind of partial justification. Yet another group
of commentators dissents from both these positions, claiming that provocation is
neither a partial justification nor a partial excuse. These scholars argue that the
justification/excuse framework is an inapposite mechanism for making sense of
provocation. What all these scholars have in common, however, is resistance to the
obvious possibility that the rationale for provocation is grounded in both partial
excuse and partial justification. The near-consensus opinion is that a partial
defense cannot be coherently grounded in both partial justification and partial
excuse.3 While the doctrine of provocation is acknowledged to exhibit the
appearance of both justificatory and excusing characteristics,4 most scholars treat
this as the puzzle to be resolved, not the key to understanding the doctrine’s
rationale.5 The apparently dual nature of provocation is usually considered an
unfortunate artifact of the common law’s ad hoc development, a sign of confused
thinking by judges and legislatures,6 and evidence of the need to abolish or amend
the defense.7

3

A notable exception to this rule is A.J. Ashworth, who has argued that a combination of partial
excuse and partial justification provides the normative basis of English provocation law as well as
describing its key features. A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292
(1976). We could find no other whole-hearted advocacy for such a position apart from that of the
Law Reform Commission of Ireland. The Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Consultation Paper
on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation, LRC CP 27-2003, 141. We address these views Part II.B.2.
infra, in which we argue that Ashworth and the Irish Commission notwithstanding, no one has
advanced a compelling theoretical framework for a combined account of provocation, nor provided
refutations of the main criticisms of such combined accounts.
4
See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 149
(“provocation has both justification and excuse dimensions”); Vera Bergelson, Victims and
Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385,
418 (2005) (“In sum, the partial defense of provocation includes elements of both excusatory and
justificatory rationales.” (emphasis added)); Robert Mison, Comment, Homophobia in
Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 146
(1992) (“The common law categories of sufficient provocation are best explained by justification
analysis, while the concept of excuse appears to be behind the requirement that the defendant act in
anger.” (emphasis added))
5
See, e.g., J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 20 (Alan White ed.
1968) (“[W]hen we plead, say, provocation, there is genuine uncertainty or ambiguity as to what we
mean—is he partly responsible, because he roused a violent impulse or passion in me, so that it
wasn’t truly or merely me acting ‘of my own accord’ (excuse)? Or is it rather that, he having done
me such injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justification)?”); Reid Fontaine, Adequate
(Non)Provocation, at 10 (“American common law has been inconsistent in its treatment of the
doctrine as one of justification or excuse.”); see also Marcia Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion,
in SETTING THE MORAL COMPASS: ESSAYS BY WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS 357 (Cheshire Calhoun ed.,
2004) (“[A] closer look at [provocation] reveals that it is not purely an excuse; it is, somewhat
confusedly, partly a justification.”).
6
Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467, 480
(1988) (“Confusion surrounds the provocation defense. . . . It is likely that some of the confusion
surrounding the defense is inherent to the situation, but it is also probably true that English and
American courts were insufficiently concerned about the justification-excuse distinctions while the
law developed.”).
7
Baron, supra note 5, at358 (“That the heat of passion is not purely a partial excuse or purely a
partial justification suggests that the defense needs to be abandoned or modified, or at least
reconceptualized.”).
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Even the small handful of scholars who have demonstrated appreciation for
provocation’s justificatory dimension as well as its excusing dimension
nonetheless do not frame their positions as a combination of partial justification
and partial excuse.8 Instead, the orthodox view remains that the act of killing in
provocation is partially excused, but not partially justified. This position is
routinely grounded in the oft-repeated but rarely challenged proposition that
justification and excuse are mutually exclusive, as well in that proposition’s
regular stable mate, the claim that partial justification is an incoherent notion.
The orthodox view is wrong. A coherent and cohesive rationale for
provocation can be crafted from the dual bases of partial excuse and partial
justification. Put simply, partial excuse and partial justification are necessary and
sufficient conditions for provocation manslaughter. Neither partial excuse alone,
nor partial justification alone, provides sufficient mitigation for an intentional,
wrongful killing to be treated as manslaughter rather than murder. An intentional
killing deserves to be treated as manslaughter rather than murder—and deserves to
be punished accordingly—only when both justifying and excusing conditions
apply.
We argue that such a rationale is preferable to existing theories of
provocation along both descriptive and normative dimensions. The rationale we
propose not only makes more sense of the contours of the doctrine, but also
appropriately distinguishes those intentional killings that deserve to be treated as
manslaughter from those that deserve to be treated as murder. Indeed, we argue
that many of the problems associated with the modern application of the
provocation doctrine9—and especially those associated with its Model Penal Code
reformulation—result from a failure to fully appreciate the need for partially
justifying conditions in provocation cases.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents an overview of the
provocation manslaughter doctrine. Part II critically assesses accounts or theories
of provocation advanced thus far in the scholarly literature. Part III briefly
introduces our competing account according to which mitigation from murder to
manslaughter is warranted only when actor is both partially justified and partially
excused. Part IV adds further flesh to that skeletal presentation in the context of
anticipating and rebutting possible objections.
8

See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997); Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocation and
Pluralism, 64 MOD. L. REV. 815, 819 (2001); Andrew von Hirsh and Nils Jareborg, Provocation
and Culpability, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 241, 253 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987).
9
See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 8, at 332 (1997) (criticizing the application of the passion defense to
numerous cases of intimate homicide in which the victim merely indicated a desire “to leave a
miserable relationship”); Laurie Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1679 (1986) (claiming “the
legal standards that define adequate provocation and passionate ‘human’ weaknesses reflect a male
view of understandable homicidal violence,” making it difficult for women to secure manslaughter
verdicts); Susan Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 197, 197 (2005) (arguing that “we should not allow adultery to mitigate murder to voluntary
manslaughter”); Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as
Insufficient Provocation, supra note 4.
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF PROVOCATION
A.

Historical Development

While the influence of provocation on English homicide law can be traced
back to the decisions of Twelfth Century judges and juries,10 the doctrine of
provocation began to take a form recognizable to modern scholars during the
Seventeenth Century.11 Two requirements for a killing to be treated as
manslaughter due to provocation rather than murder crystallized during this period.
First, the killing must have occurred while the killer was “in the heat of blood.” A
killing in cold-blooded revenge, even if it was in response to provocation, was
murder.12 Second, the heat of blood must have been brought about by provocation
that was adequate, that is, sufficiently grave. The law came to recognize four
distinct—and exhaustive—categories of provocative conduct “considered
sufficiently grave to warrant the reduction from murder to manslaughter of a hotblooded intentional killing.”13 The categories were: (1) A grossly insultive assault;
(2) Witnessing an attack upon a friend or relative; (3) Seeing an Englishman
unlawfully deprived of his liberty; and (4) Witnessing one’s wife (and, obviously,
another person) in the act of adultery.14
Horder argues that, at their inception, both the heat of passion requirement
and the categories of adequate provocation reflected the “touchy, quixotic concern
for honour”15 that was prevalent in early modern England. According to this social
code, disdainful or contemptuous conduct was considered an “affront,” an
intentional attempt to undermine a man’s (presumptively virtuous) reputation. To
protect his honor, a man had to retaliate: he had to respond physically, and with
anger.16 Only a passionate and physical response demonstrated that the affronted
man possessed the Aristotelian virtues of courage and “spirit.” But such virtues
were, by definition, the mean between extremes. The retaliation, while passionate,
had to be proportionate to the gravity of the affront. 17
The four categories of adequate provocation captured circumstances that
were considered affronts serious enough to warrant a violent response, but not
serious enough to warrant a lethal response, in order to re-establish an honorable
reputation.18 A man who killed in response to provocation falling within one of
the four categories “departed from the mean in point of retributive justice by
inflicting excessive retaliation, although, given the gravity of the provocation, it is
not greatly excessive.”19 As the killer’s actions were an over-reaction—but not a
gross over-reaction—manslaughter rather than murder was considered the
10

JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, 1-22 (1992). The following section draws
heavily on Horder’s thorough and lucid investigation of the evolution of provocation in English
law.
11
Id. at 23.
12
Id. at 23-24.
13
Id. at 24.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 25.
16
Id. at 27.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 52.
19
Id.
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appropriate offense. If the provocation was so extreme that killing in anger was
considered an appropriate response, no criminal liability was imposed.20 On the
other hand, if the provocation was less grave than that which the four categories of
adequate provocation covered, killing in anger was grossly excessive and therefore
considered murder.21
According to Horder then, the early provocation doctrine was centered on
partial justification. A gravely-affronted man was justified in responding
physically and angrily. A proportionate response was fully justified, but an
excessive response was only partially justified. Seen through the lens of honor,
anger or outrage was an integral component of the (fully controlled) righteous
response of the wronged man.22 Both the heat of blood requirement and the
adequate provocation requirement were grounded in partial justification.
Crucially, in this early period of the provocation doctrine’s development, no
mention was made of loss of self-control.23 There was no suggestion that the
wronged man had lost control, and therefore no inference that he was not
responsible for his conduct. In short, notions of excuse did not play a role in
deeming a provoked killing to be manslaughter.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, “a new
conception of anger”24 gained ascendancy. Anger and other emotions were seen as
capable of interfering with, even overwhelming, reason. Sufficient anger was
therefore understood to cause a loss of self-control.25 As one commentator of the
time put it, great anger “rendereth the man deaf to the voice of reason.”26 This loss
of self-control, this inability to conform your actions to the dictates of reason,
became the basis for partially excusing those who killed in the heat of blood. The
categories of adequate provocation were retained. For a time they were important
for “evidentiary reasons”27: such grave provocation gave rise to a legal
presumption “that the defendant was in fact carried to revenge by the irresistible
influence of ungovernable passion.”28 Those who killed as a result of conduct that
did not fall within the four categories of adequate provocation were presumed not
to have lost their capacity for self-control. The cause of the killing was therefore
traced to the defendant’s malignant design.29
This presumption was, of course, a legal fiction.30 It was possible that a
person (of particularly bad temper, say) could show that he genuinely lost selfcontrol as a result of minor provocation—that is, provocative conduct not captured
by the four categories. The courts and commentators acknowledged this fiction,
20
“Honour theorists” asserted “a right to administer proportional requital personally, precisely
because they felt that the law offered no or no adequate means of redress for what men of honour
took to be serious affronts against honour.” Id. at 50.
21
Id. at 52-53.
22
Id. at 42.
23
Id. at 42.
24
Id. at 73.
25
Id. at 75.
26
Id. at 76 n.28 (quoting Foster).
27
Id. at 89.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 96-100; see also Ashworth, supra note 3, at 292-293.
30
Id. at 94.
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and the importance of adequate provocation morphed once more. Lack of
adequate provocation was taken not as evidence that the defendant could not have
lost self-control, but rather that the defendant ought not have lost self-control, or
ought not “to have vented it to the extent [he] did in the circumstances.”31
Underlying the categories of provocation, as Ashworth puts it, “was more than a
hint that people ought not to yield to certain types of provocation, and that if they
did the law should offer no concession to them.”32 The strict categories of
adequate provocation were gradually softened and eventually the categorical
approach was replaced by a standard of reasonableness. Rather than being
restricted to a predetermined set of situations, adequate provocation was
determined by reference to whether in the relevant circumstances any reasonable
person would have been so subject to passion as to temporarily lose control.33
B. The Current Doctrine of Provocation
The majority of U.S. jurisdictions retain a version of the common law
defense of provocation. In these states, the criminal codes have incorporated,
either explicitly or implicitly, the principles developed by common law.34 The
doctrine has not, however, developed identically in the jurisdictions that retain the
common law defense. The states differ, for example, as to whether mere words35
or wrongs done to a third party36 can amount to adequate provocation, and as to
whether a time delay between the provoking act and the killing that would allow a
reasonable man time to cool off precludes the defense.37 As a result of these
divergences, it is common to declare that provocation “enjoys no canonical
definition.”38 These differences notwithstanding, it is possible to identify key
features of the provocation doctrine that are common to all the jurisdictions that
retain the common law defense. Our goal in this Article is to present a rationale
that explains these central, common features of the provocation doctrine. We do
not attempt to provide a rationale that explains doctrinal rules that have been
accepted by some, but not all, common law jurisdictions. Indeed, to the extent that
such rules cannot be explained by our theory, we would consider this as grounds
for arguing for abandonment of the rules.39
31

Id. at 99.
Ashworth, supra note 3, at 295.
33
HORDER, supra note 10, at 99. The reasonable person standard has found its way into statutes and
case law in England and many U.S. states. See, e.g., Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3
(Eng.); R. v. Duffy, [1949] 1 All E.R. 932; Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (provocation must be
“sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person”); see generally, WAYNE LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 448, 777 (4th ed. 2004). There is some controversy surrounding whether the
relevant standard is (or should be) a reasonable person or the reasonable person, a reasonable man
or a reasonable person, and whether the emotion, loss of control or the actual killing or violence has
to be reasonable. See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1403; LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW, supra, at 777, and the discussion at note 194, infra.
34
For a description of the different textual devices employed in the state codes for defining
provocation, see Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982), at 430-31.
35
See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 780-781; Nourse, Passion’s Progress,
supra note 8, at 1342.
36
See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 782-783.
37
See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 448, supra note 33, at 786-787.
38
Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677 (2005), at 1691.
39
A full exploration of which peripheral doctrinal features ought to be abandoned is beyond the
scope of this Article. But as a preliminary matter, we consider the “reasonable cooling off period”
32
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In eleven states, the common law defense of provocation has been subject
to significant statutory reform. The legislatures in these jurisdictions have enacted
statutes that include language mirroring the “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance” provision of the Model Penal Code.40 The resulting defense is
broader than its common law cousin,41 and the differences between the two
defenses make it at least debatable whether they share a common rationale.
1. The common law.—In states that retain the common law defense of
provocation, an intentional killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
manslaughter if, at the time of the killing, the defendant was subject to heat of
passion caused by adequate provocation.42 From this statement of the doctrine,
which accords with that given by most commentators, we can isolate three central
features of the provocation defense:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The actor must have killed while in the heat of passion;
The heat of passion must have been brought about by adequate
provocation;
Provocation is a partial defense. The defense reduces the offense
from murder to manslaughter. Provocation does not exonerate a
defendant, but neither is it merely a mitigating factor considered in
determining the appropriate sentence.

The first two features—heat of passion and adequate provocation—are the
requirements of the doctrine that a defendant must establish in order for the
defense to apply. The third feature—the partial nature of the defense—describes
the legal effect of the doctrine.
This statement of the doctrine’s key features differs from those some
commentators provide. In most cases, the differences are merely of expression,
rather than reflecting substantive disagreement. For example, Wayne LaFave states
that there are four obstacles, rather than two, that a defendant must overcome in
order to establish the defense:
(1) There must have been a reasonable provocation. (2) The
defendant must have been in fact provoked. (3) A reasonable
person so provoked would not have cooled off in the interval of
rule to be a potential candidate for rejection. On our theory, a person who kills while still in the
heat of passion, and due to reasons that decrease the wrongfulness of the killing, satisfies the both
the partial excuse and partial justification requirements of provocation – notwithstanding the fact
that a reasonable person would have “cooled off” in the interim. Similarly, we are sympathetic to
the claim that the provocation defense ought to be available to victims of domestic abuse who kill
their abusers (though we make no claim that provocation is the best way for the law to deal with
such situations). That the person killed was the killer’s abuser partially justifies the act of killing,
and the existence of some emotional state (whether anger, fear, or some other emotion) affecting
cognitive capacity satisfies the requirement of partial excuse.
40
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b).
41
See, e.g., PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW (1997), at 711-712.
42
See, e.g., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 775 (voluntary manslaughter consists of an
intentional homicide where “the defendant, when he killed the victim, was in a state of passion
engendered in him by an adequate provocation”).
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time between the provocation and the delivery of the fatal blow.
And (4), the defendant must not in fact have cooled off during the
interval.43
LaFave’s first two “obstacles,” however, are simply other ways of stating
what we call the adequate provocation and heat of passion requirements. LaFave
uses adequate provocation and reasonable provocation interchangeably,44 and a
defendant who was “in fact provoked” is one in whom the provocation in fact
caused the heat of passion.45 LaFave’s third obstacle is best understood as an
aspect of the adequate provocation requirement: provocation is adequate if it
would have induced heat of passion in the reasonable person at the time the killing
occurred.46 LaFave’s fourth obstacle is likewise best treated as an aspect of the
requirement that the killing occur while the killer is in the heat of passion: a
defendant who has cooled off in the period between the provoking incident and the
act of killing is no longer in the heat of passion when the killing occurs.
Other commentators refer to provocation as consisting of a subjective
requirement and an objective requirement (or, in some cases, a descriptive
component and an evaluative component). Again, these elements map onto the
requirements we refer to as heat of passion and adequate provocation. Whether
the defendant was in fact subject to the heat of passion at the time of the killing is
commonly described as the doctrine’s subjective component, while the question of
adequacy of provocation (usually by reference to whether a reasonable person
would have been provoked) is referred to as the objective component. We have
chosen to use the heat of passion and adequate provocation terminology, rather
than subjective and objective, for a number of reasons. Heat of passion and
adequate provocation are the more commonly used terms, and are more
transparent and evocative of the requirements to which they refer.47
In a recent article, Stephen Garvey describes the provocation defense as
having three requirements, namely the adequate provocation requirement, the
passion requirement, and the reasonable loss of self-control requirement.48 This
classification of the elements of provocation, we suggest, is not the most useful
way of analyzing the defense. The third of Garvey’s requirements conflates two
elements best kept separate—namely that the defendant actually lost self-control,
and that this loss of self-control was reasonable. Moreover, Garvey’s requirement
that the defendant actually lost self-control is merely an alternate way of
43

LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 777.
LaFave defines adequate provocation as “a provocation which would cause a reasonable man to
lose his normal self-control.” Id. at 775.
45
Id. at 776 (describing provocation as inducing “emotional disturbance (in earlier terminology,
while in a ‘heat of passion’)”).
46
To the extent that reasonable cooling off period is a separate requirement of provocation, it
nonetheless ought not be treated as a central feature of the doctrine as not all jurisdictions limit
provocation to circumstances in which a reasonable person would have not have had time to “cool
down.” See id. at 786.
47
Using the terms “subjective” and “objective” for the requirements of provocation also runs the
risk that we will be misunderstood as endorsing the view that justifications are purely objective
while excuses are purely subjective—a view we do not hold.
48
Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1677. Garvey describes these three requirements as
constituting “the core elements of the defense itself.” Id. His list of the doctrine’s basic elements
also includes the legal effect of the defense, “which is to mitigate, not exonerate.” Id.
44
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describing the passion requirement: the “passion” required for the defense to apply
is emotion of a kind and to a degree that interferes with the defendant’s ability to
exercise self-control.49 The requirement that this loss of self-control be reasonable
is, likewise, simply another way of framing the requirement of adequate
provocation: provocation is adequate if it would have provoked an “ordinary,”
“reasonable,” or “average” person.50
The most useful framework for understanding the elements of provocation
is in terms of the dual requirements of heat of passion and adequate provocation.
Together with the partial nature of the defense and its limitation to the offense of
murder, these constitute the features that a theory of provocation must account for.
Other rules that flesh out the doctrine are best understood as falling under the
umbrella of either heat of passion or adequate provocation.51 We have
deliberately chosen this nomenclature to be neutral with respect to the
disagreement about what provocation counts as “adequate” and the precise
relationship between the requisite emotional disturbance and self-control.
2. The Model Penal Code.— The Model Penal Code mitigates a killing
from murder to manslaughter if it “occurred under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”52
Eleven states currently have statutes containing this provision of the Code, in full
or in part.53 While this provision has not been incorporated into state law to the
same extent as some other parts of the Code, and some jurisdictions that enacted
the Code’s formulation soon reverted to the common law version of provocation,54
it is nonetheless a significant alternative to common law provocation.
49

While the requirement is often stated in terms of loss of self-control, this is misleading. A better
understanding of the required passion is that it impairs the defendant’s ability to conform his
actions to the balance of reasons applicable in the circumstances, that the emotional disturbance
makes it more difficult—but not impossible—to act in the correct manner. The effect of passion on
self-control is discussed in detail infra Part II.B.
50
The appropriate standard is inconsistently described in the cases on provocation, with these terms
and numerous others used interchangeable. See Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in
Search of a Rationale, supra note 34, at 433. We have therefore chosen to use “adequate
provocation” as a way of describing this requirement while remaining agnostic as to whether the
standard is that of an ordinary man rather than a reasonable man or a reasonable person, and so on.
51
Other rules that flesh out these two essential features of provocation in at least some jurisdictions
include the requirement that the provocation be sudden, that the provocation be more than mere
words, that the provocation must consist of a wrong to the defendant rather than a third party; and
that the emotion caused by the provocation must be anger or resentment. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 33, at 775-88; Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1687 n.35, 1689 n.38;
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, supra note 34, at 432434.
52
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b).
53
Nine states have enacted the Code’s formulation in full: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10104(a)(1); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a(a); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. §§
632(3), 641; Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 797-702(2), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
507.020(1)(a), 507.030(1)(b); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(1); New York, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.20(2), North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(2); and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 163.115(1)(a), 163.118(1)(b), 163.135. Two states have enacted part of the extreme emotional
disturbance provision: New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:2; and Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-205(1)(b).
54
Dan Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1996), at 323.
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The “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” (EMED) formulation
represents a substantial reform of the provocation defense. The EMED defense is
not restricted to loss of self-control caused by passion stemming from adequate
provocation. The disturbance undermining self-control may be mental as well as
emotional, and the emotional or mental disturbance need not arise from provoking
conduct at all.55 When there is provocation, the EMED defense may apply
regardless of whether the person killed was the provoker, or whether the
provocation was directed at the defendant or a third party. The Model Penal Code
does require that the excuse or explanation for the actor’s distress be reasonable,
but the reasonableness of the excuse or explanation is “determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he
believed them to be.”56
Because of these differences between the common law defense of
provocation and the Model Penal Code’s EMED defense, the theory that best
explains the features of common law provocation may not offer the best
explanation for the EMED defense, and vice versa. In this article, we present a
theory of common law provocation, with a relatively brief discussion of the
implications of this theory for the Model Penal Code’s EMED defense.
II. THEORIES OF PROVOCATION
A.

Overview of Defenses

All commentators seem to agree that provocation is best conceptualized as
a partial defense.57 (We call this the Partial Defense Thesis.) We agree.
Provocation is not merely a mitigating factor relevant to determining the severity
of a sentence; generally, it results in conviction for a separately denominated
offense, namely voluntary manslaughter.58 Nor is provocation manslaughter
merely a different offense from murder, like assault or involuntary manslaughter.
As with other defenses such as insanity or self-defense, and unlike involuntary
manslaughter or assault, a provoked killing satisfies all the elements of murder, but
55

See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1690.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.3(1)(b).
57
The term “defense” is used ambiguously in criminal law. Broadly understood, a “defense” is any
doctrine that precludes the defendant from being convicted. For example, the principle that a
defendant cannot be convicted of an offense in the absence of proof of every element in the offense
definition is sometimes referred to as the “absent-element” or “failure of proof” defense. See, e.g.,
Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 213216 (1982) (defenses consist of five sorts: absent-element defenses, offense modifications,
justifications, excuses, and nonexculpatory defenses); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW supra note 33
(using the term “failure of proof” to refer to “absent-element” defenses). However, this principle is
better conceived as a normal rule of liability rather than as a defense properly understood. See, e.g.,
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 41, at 379-380 (1997). We therefore use the term “defense”
narrowly to mean doctrines that preclude conviction for an offense, due to the existence of
extenuating circumstances, despite all the elements of the offense definition being satisfied. The
consensus among commentators is that provocation is a partial defense in this narrow sense of
“defense.”
58
In a small minority of states, the defense of provocation results in conviction for a lower degree
of murder. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(1) (defining provocation as second degree murder);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(1)(d) (defining provocation as a felony of the second degree).
56
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in circumstances that make a murder conviction inappropriate. Unlike with
complete defenses such as insanity or self-defense, where the extenuating
circumstance is provocation, conviction for a lesser crime—voluntary
manslaughter—is still appropriate, making the defense of provocation partial in
nature.
Most commentators, moreover, agree that there are three—and only
three—basic species of defense: (1) justifications, (2) excuses, and (3) nonexculpatory defenses.59 (We call this the Exhaustive Classification Thesis, and
understand it to be capacious enough to allow for combinations of the basic
forms.) If this orthodox view is correct, provocation manslaughter would be a
partial version of one or more of these types of defense. No one believes that
provocation is a non-exculpatory defense. This category covers defenses related to
public policy considerations independent of the culpability of the defendant, such
as statutes of limitation for criminal prosecution.60 This leaves justification and
excuse as the remaining candidates. Almost everyone concludes—or, perhaps
more accurately, assumes—that provocation must be in the nature of excuse (albeit
partial) or in the nature of justification (albeit partial). 61 In the following section,
we describe and critique the existing accounts of provocation, focusing primarily
on the predominant view of partial excuse, but also addressing contrary views that
claim provocation to be either a partial justification or (in denial of the exhaustive
classification thesis) partial forms of neither justification nor excuse.
B.

Critical Overview of Existing Accounts of Provocation

Over the years, criminal law theorists have contributed scores of accounts
aimed to describe and rationally reformulate the theoretical underpinnings of
provocation doctrine. Some of these efforts are difficult or contestable to classify,
for we often find ourselves resisting the author’s own characterization of her
theory. Our overview, then, proceeds as follows. The dominant view is that
provocation is a partial excuse. If it is a partial excuse, then some sense must be
made of the adequate provocation prong. Roughly speaking, some partial excuse
theorists believe that prong should be abandoned, some view it as requiring that
the heat of passion itself be excused, the remainder view it as requiring that the
heat of passion be justified. A second position views provocation as partially
justified. A third view sees it as a combination of partial excuse and partial
justification. As best we can tell, this position has been endorsed by just two
scholars over the past fifty years. It is the view that this Article will develop and
defend. The final position rejects the excuse/justification framework.
1. Partial excuse.—The dominant view holds that provocation is in the
nature of a partial excuse.62 As Timothy Macklem and John Gardner observe, “by
59

See, e.g., Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, supra note 2, at 6 & n.8.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 448.
61
There are notable exceptions to this position, theorists such as Kahan and Nussbaum, who claim
provocation sounds in neither justification nor excuse. We address these theories in Part II.B
below.
62
The most prominent advocate of a partial excuse rationale for provocation is Joshua Dressler.
See generally Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, supra note
34; Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002); Dressler,
60
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common consent, provocation is a (partial) excuse for murderous actions.”63
Partial excuse theories treat the heat of passion requirement as the key element of
provocation doctrine. The central idea is that heat of passion impairs a person’s
agency. A person who is affected by extreme anger finds it more difficult to
exercise self-control than a person in a cooler emotional state. Proponents of
partial excuse theories of provocation refer to our “common experience”64 as
demonstrating that anger undermines our ability to make appropriate choices, and
therefore makes us “less able to respond in a legally and morally appropriate
fashion.”65 A defendant who kills while under the influence of heat of passion is
therefore considered less blameworthy than had the killing occurred when the
defendant’s choice-making capabilities were unimpaired, and hence deserving of
conviction of a lesser offense and the concomitant lesser punishment. From this
perspective, provocation manslaughter is a “concession to human frailty.”66 It is a
concession to a particular kind of human frailty: our susceptibility to being
overborne by strong emotions. Like complete excuses such as insanity, the partial
defense of provocation is premised upon respect for individuals as “choosing
beings.”67 Provoked killers are entitled to lesser punishment because heat of
passion diminishes a person’s choice-making capability.
The phrase loss of self-control is commonly used to explain the effect of
heat of passion. This is misleading. In provocation, the notion is that heat of
passion interferes with, but does not completely destroy, an actor’s capacity to
control conduct. The claim is not that the provoked killer couldn’t control his
conduct, but that in the circumstances such control was more difficult—
phenomenologically speaking.68 When a person is completely unable to control
his behavior then the appropriate response, at least in principle, is to hold him
criminally blameless—that is, to treat the person as completely excused.69 Heat of
passion is a partial excuse because the actor’s choice-making capacities are so
substantially undermined that it would be unfair to treat the actor as fully
blameworthy, although his choice-making capacities are not completely
extinguished.70
Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, supra note 6. Other accounts of provocation
manslaughter that sound in partial excuse include Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications
from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 96 (1986); SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE
KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE, 13-14 (1994); Uma Narayan & Andrew
von Hirsch, Three Concepts of Provocation, in CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1996, at 18-19;
Macklem & Gardner, supra note 8; Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion, supra note 5.
63
Macklem & Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism supra note 8, at 819.
64
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 463.
65
Id. at 464.
66
The judgments and commentaries that refer to manslaughter are legion. The most commonly
cited early authorities include WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 191 (1791); R. v.
Hayward, 6 C & P 157, 159 (1833) (“the law, in compassion to human infirmity, would hold the
offence to amount to manslaughter only”); People v. Maher, 10 Mich. 212 (1862) (the law
designates provocation as manslaughter “out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature”).
67
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 24, 33 (1968).
68
In the provocation manslaughter literature, self-control is generally understood as a
psychological, experiential, or phenomenological concept, not as a contra-causal one. Like other
participants to the debate, we wish to bracket worries touching on the metaphysics of free-will.
69
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 464.
70
See, e.g., Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 62, at 983 (“It is precisely
because we believe that the provoked party’s capacity for self-control is not completely undermined
that the defense is partial.”).
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We do not challenge this understanding of the relationships among anger,
rational choice-making capacity, blameworthiness, and criminal liability. We
accept: that anger can interfere with our abilities to make appropriate choices about
conduct;71 that degree of control is relevant to moral blameworthiness; and that
persons should not be punished in excess of what their blameworthiness
warrants.72 Indeed, we accept that partial excuse provides a rationale for the
provocation doctrine’s heat of passion requirement. However, the orthodox view
of provocation as partial excuse must also explain the doctrine’s adequate
provocation requirement. This has proven a more difficult task.
Individual theories of provocation as partial excuse vary regarding the
adequate provocation requirement. Some theorists argue that the adequate
provocation requirement should be abandoned, that heat of passion alone should
suffice to reduce an offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter. On this
view, the only relevant enquiry is the subjective question of whether the defendant
in fact had, to the requisite degree, lost self-control.73 Note that this position is
similar to, but more extreme than, that of the MPC’s EMED defense, which
“subjectivizes” (or “particularizes”), but does not eliminate, the requirement that
the mental or emotional distress be reasonable.74

71

This is not to say that we accept it is natural to “lose control” in specific situations, such as a
husband witnessing his wife’s adultery. Contrast H.L.A. Hart’s statement that “common sense
generalizations” about “human nature” tell us that men are “capable of self-control when
confronted with an open till but not when confronted with a wife in adultery.” HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 67, at 33, quoted in Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at
1369. Nor are we denying that our emotions themselves have a cognitive component, nor that
people are often capable of restraint while under the influence of great anger. See Kahan &
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, supra note 54 (proposing the evaluative
conception of emotion as superior to the mechanistic conception); Rozelle, Controlling Passion,
supra note 9, at 225 (suggesting that “a policeman at the elbow” usually enables a person to control
her actions, despite emotional turmoil). None of these views is incompatible with the claim that
heat of passion can make self-control more difficult. Anyone who has been deeply wronged, or
even cut off in traffic, will have experienced that maintaining self-control while angry requires
greater psychic effort. For a recent critique of the connection between capacity for self-control and
criminal responsibility, see Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, supra note 4, at 149-159.
72
The extent of the contemporary embrace of this last proposition, often running under the heading
of “negative retributivism” or “side-constrained consequentialism,” is discussed in Mitchell N.
Berman, Are We All Consequentialists Now?, in R.A. DUFF AND STUART GREEN, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2010). Of course, that undermined
choice-capacity reduces blameworthiness and thus demands a reduction in criminal punishment, all
else being equal, does not itself say anything about the class or title of offense for which one should
be convicted. As will be made plain below, we believe that undermined choice-capacity alone is
not the best explanation or justification for treating a provoked killing as manslaughter rather than
murder.
73
See, e.g., J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (1st ed. 1965); Peter Brett, The
Physiology of Provocation, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 634, 638; Alec Samuels, Excusable Loss of SelfControl in Homicide, 34 MOD. L. REV. 163, 170 (1971); Jack K. Weber, Some Provoking Aspects
of Voluntary Manslaughter Law, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 159, 160 (1981); Richard Singer, The
Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27
B.C. L. REV. 243 (1986).
74
Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1339-40; see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW, § 4.2.1, at 246 (1978).
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Most contemporary scholars, however, including most proponents of
partial excuse, resist this purely subjective approach. Most believe that the
provocation defense ought not be available to all actors who killed while under the
influence of heat of passion. A defendant whose partial loss of control was
brought about by a trivial slight deserves to be convicted of murder, not
manslaughter. The majority of partial excuse theorists therefore supports retaining
the adequate provocation requirement, and generally argue that it properly serves
to ensure the emotional state that undermines self-control is itself either excused or
justified.
(a) Excused emotion. Joshua Dressler explains the adequate provocation
requirement as ensuring that the defendant’s heat of passion (that is, the emotional
state) is itself excused.75 According to Dressler:
[P]rovocation is an excuse premised upon involuntariness based
upon reduced choice-capacities. If the doctrine is to be defensible,
however, it must follow that the anger which undermines the
choice-capability is itself formed under circumstances in which the
actor cannot be fairly blamed for his anger. Otherwise, we have a
case of voluntary anger, no more morally deserving of mitigation
than voluntary intoxication.76
In Dressler’s view, provocation is excuse all the way down. And for
Dressler, the rationale for excuse is interference with choice. Excuse generally
involves situations where an actor is not blameworthy, or not fully blameworthy,77
because the actor’s “ability to make meaningful choices is dramatically reduced.”78
But if the actor is responsible for choosing an emotional state which makes control
of conduct more difficult, we are entitled to blame the actor for the emotional
state—and therefore to blame the actor for the wrongful conduct that eventuates.
The actor is only entitled to mitigation when the actor’s emotional state is itself
involuntary, by which Dressler means that “the actor’s choice-making capabilities
have been so undermined that the actor cannot be justly blamed” for the emotional
state.79

75

Dressler seems to have modified his views on this point in his more recent scholarship, but not to
a degree that affects his underlying claim. In his earlier work, Dressler expressly denied that anger
resulting from adequate provocation was justified; it was merely blameless, that is, excused. See
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 465. However, he has more recently
admitted that some provocation entitles a person to feel anger, so that “we may characterize the
emotion as, in some sense, justifiable.” Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note
62, at 972. But Dressler continues to insist that, while provoked anger may be justified, it need not
be justified in order for provocation to apply. In other words, that the anger be justified is not a
requirement of the provocation defense; that the anger is “excusable” suffices. Id. at 973.
76
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 464. That a person who has become
voluntarily intoxicated cannot avoid responsibility for a criminal offence by arguing that he lacked
the requisite mental state is an example of a forfeiture rule. The defendant forfeits his claim
because he voluntarily created the conditions that he is relying on to avoid blame. Dressler’s
approach is therefore sometimes described as treating the adequate provocation requirement as a
forfeiture rule. See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1709 & 1710 n.98.
77
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 34, at 460.
78
Id. at 461.
79
Id.
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The adequate provocation requirement fulfills the role of distinguishing
between heat of passion for which the actor is to blame, and heat of passion for
which the actor is excused. The defendant is to blame for anger in the absence of
adequate provocation—that is, if “the ordinary law-abiding person would not
become angry [in that] particular provocative situation.”80 Thus, on Dressler’s
account, whether a person chose to be angry is determined by whether an ordinary
or reasonable person would have been angry in the relevant circumstances. If an
ordinary person would have been angry (that is, if there was reasonable
provocation), then the actor is treated as not responsible for the anger, and
therefore less blameworthy for the deadly conduct. But if an ordinary person
would not have been angry, then the actor is treated as becoming angry voluntarily,
and is therefore completely blameworthy for the act of killing.
We find this account implausible. Assuming arguendo that we ought to
draw a line between anger for which the actor is responsible, and anger for which
the actor is not responsible, the requirement of adequate provocation does not
achieve this distinction, for the correlation between whether an individual’s anger
is voluntary (in Dressler’s sense of voluntary), and whether a reasonable person
would have become angry in the same circumstances is simply too weak. We all
know people who are more easily angered than the average person (just as we
know people with an unusually high ability to remain calm).81 To some extent,
this may be due to a failure of will-power: we may say of such people that they
indulge their anger. But it is also surely due to those standing dispositions that we
call character: resisting anger, and maintaining self-control, is simply more
difficult for some people than others. Now, the degree to which we are responsible
for our own character, and therefore to blame for our bad character, is a difficult
question. We cannot adequately answer that question here. Suffice it to say that
our characters are formed by some combination of innate tendencies, upbringing,
and choices we make about how we live and act. While we bear some
responsibility for our characters, they are not simply the product of our conscious
choices. The mere fact that a defendant was more easily angered than an ordinary
person does not demonstrate that the defendant is more responsible, and therefore
more blameworthy, for his anger.
If we are concerned, as Dressler is, about whether a defendant is to blame
for his or her emotions, the current doctrine’s inquiry into the adequacy of
provocation is the wrong approach. A more appropriate inquiry would look to
whether the defendant had inculcated habits of emotional discipline, or had been
subjected to inappropriate influences or trauma during his or her emotional
development. The adequate provocation requirement is simply not directed
towards factors that distinguish between whether a defendant is to blame for his or
her emotional state, and therefore whether the heat of passion experienced ought to
be excused.
(b) Justified emotion. Some commentators who claim that provocation is a
partial excuse explain the adequate provocation requirement by arguing that the

80
81

Id. at 464.
The authors believe that at least one of them falls in the latter category.
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defendant’s heat of passion is justified rather than excused.82 Scholars who take
this approach argue that a person who kills in the heat of passion is entitled to have
his act of killing partially excused only if his emotion – heat of passion – was
justified. Hence the requirement of adequate provocation: anger is justified only if
it is in response to adequate provocation. Anger in response to trivial provocation,
or no provocation at all, is not justified.
Despite the element of justified emotion, advocates of this approach
characterize their accounts as excuse theories.83 Nonetheless, this approach
concedes that while the usual conception of excuse due to loss of self-control can
explain provocation’s heat of passion requirement, it cannot account for the
adequate provocation requirement. So the concept of justification is recruited, in a
limited capacity, to fill this explanatory gap. Justified emotion theorists seek to
rely on excuse to explain the heat of passion requirement, and justification to
explain the adequate provocation requirement. But most justified emotion
theorists insist that only the emotion is justified; they deny that the act of killing is
even partially justified.84 By restricting the application of justification to the
emotion, not the act, they claim to avoid two criticisms that their theories would
otherwise attract – namely the charge that an act cannot be both partially excused
and partially justified,85 and the claim that provoked killings should not be
considered partially justified.86
The difficulty for justified emotion theories of provocation is how to
explain why, if the killing is partially excused (but still wrong) because the actor’s
self-control is impaired, the defense is available only if the debilitating emotion
was justified. A defendant hasn’t lost control to any lesser degree by virtue of the
fact that his heat of passion was unwarranted in the circumstances. To put it
another way, if mitigation is available despite the fact that killing is entirely
unjustified, why does the fact that the defendant’s emotion is unjustified preclude
mitigation? If a person who kills for the wrong reasons can receive mitigation,
why not a person who gets angry for the wrong reason?
Justified emotion theories fail to overcome this difficulty. Despite being
characterized as theories of (partial) excuse, they turn out not to be excuse theories
at all – not on the traditional understanding of excuse. The partial loss of selfcontrol plays no role in theories of justified emotion: the role of anger is
transformed from undermining volition to providing justified reasons for acting via
82

See, e.g., Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion, supra note 5, at 366-69; Macklem & Gardner,
Provocation and Pluralism, supra note 8, at 819;SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL:
RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 141 (1998); at 141; Pillsbury,
Misunderstanding Provocation, supra note 4, at 148n15; Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note
8; HORDER, supra note 10 at 156, 160; von Hirsch and Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability,
supra note 8, at 248.
83
See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1338 n40 (declaring that on her account,
provocation “remains a partial excuse”).
84
See, e.g., id. at 1394-95 (“It is by focusing on the emotion, rather than the act, that my proposal
distinguishes itself quite easily (both in theory and practice) from the traditional model of
provocation as partial justification.”); von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 8 at 248 (emphasizing that
on their account of provocation, it is only the defendant’s “anger that is warranted, not the deed that
results from it.”).
85
See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1394.
86
See, e.g., id. at 1395 & n.374.
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its cognitive component.87 Justified emotion theories are in fact properly
understood as theories of partial justification: under these theories, the act of
killing should be understood as partially justified. By invoking justified emotion,
they explain the adequate provocation requirement – but only at the expense of no
longer being able to explain the heat of passion requirement.
On justified emotion accounts of provocation, all the mitigating work is
done by the defendant’s reasons for acting. The relevance of heat of passion is
only that some instances of heat of passion embody a justified judgment – namely
that the defendant has been grievously wronged. The quantity or intensity of the
emotion is irrelevant; interference with self-control plays no role. Emotion per se
is therefore unnecessary for a defendant to deserve the provocation defense,
because she can hold the justified belief that she has been wronged in the absence
of heat of passion. Consider Parent, whose child has been killed by Villain.
Justified emotion theories cannot distinguish between the case in which Parent
kills Villain in the heat of passion after witnessing the killing, and the case in
which Parent calmly kills Villain months later during Villain’s trial. In both cases
Parent can hold the same (justified) judgment that Villain committed a grave
wrong against her (or her child), and kills for that reason. The cognitive
component of anger is not the only avenue through which one can have a justified
belief that one has been seriously wronged. One can have that belief – and be
justified in having that belief – in the absence of emotion. Justified emotion
theories consequently provide no rationale for restricting the provocation defense
to cases in which the heat of passion requirement is satisfied.
2. A heretical view: partial justification.—A small handful of scholars
reject the orthodox view and argue that provocation functions as a partial
justification.88 In contrast to the views so far discussed, partial justification
87

See, e.g., Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra note 8, at 1390 (arguing that the adequately
provoked defendant’s “excuse” is provided by “the reasons for the emotion,” and hence the
“reasons why the defendants claim they have killed,” not “[t]he quantity or intensity of the
emotion.”) (emphasis in original); Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, supra note 4, at 143
(“I disagree that emotionally-related cognitive dysfunction should mitigate punishment regardless
of reasons for emotion.”); Macklem & Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism, supra note 8, at 81920 (arguing that in making the partial excuse of provocation, the defendant admits his action was
unjustified, but relies on the fact that the “cognitive component” of his anger was justified).
Macklem and Gardner’s theory of provocation has many nuances, and draws on Gardner’s complex
and non-traditional theory of defenses that he presented in two earlier papers. See John Gardner,
The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1998); John Gardner, Justification and
Reasons, in A.P. SIMESTER & A.T.H. SMITH, HARM AND CULPABILITY (1996), at 119. A full
analysis of this theory is beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, it is enough to
observe that Macklem and Gardner’s theory of provocation cannot account for the heat of passion
requirement.
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The most prominent supporter of this view is Finbarr McAuley. See Finbarr McAuley,
Anticipating the Past: The Defense of Provocation in Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 150 (1987)
(concluding that “provocation functions is a partial justification rather than a partial excuse”);
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theories argue that a provoked killing warrants mitigation because such a killing is
less wrong than an unprovoked killing. These theorists also argue that partial
justification is the only rationale for provocation: that is, that partial justification
alone explains all the elements of the provocation doctrine.
Partial justification as a rationale for provocation has been subjected to two
sets of criticisms. The first set of criticisms rejects the claim that provoked killings
are partially justified.89 These criticisms include the claim that the notion of partial
justification is incoherent, and alternatively that provocation cannot be a partial
justification because provoked killings are just as wrong as unprovoked killings.
As the presentation of our own account (in Parts III and IV) will make clear, we
disagree with the substance of these criticisms: on our view, an adequately
provoked killing is less wrong than the paradigm intentional killing. Importantly,
however, we agree with the critics that existing proponents of the partial
justification conception have not adequately defended this pivotal claim.90 We
aim to do better in Part IV, where we defend our thesis against objections.
The second set of criticisms is that, while partial justification theories can
explain the adequate provocation requirement, they fail to explain the heat of
passion requirement.91 We agree. Restricting the provocation defense to killing in
the heat of passion cannot be explained on the basis of partial justification. Indeed,
Finbarr McAuley, the most prominent proponent of the partial justification
approach admits as much. McAuley declares that on a partial justification theory
of provocation, “a defendant who can show that he killed in the face of substantial
Human Frailty: Making Sense of Anglo-American Provocation Doctrine Through Comparative
Study, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 675, 695 (2007), referring to LAW COMM’N, PARTIAL
DEFENSES TO MURDER: FINAL REPORT (LAW. COM. NO. 290), 2004, Cm. 6301 (2004). This
attribution is dubious. The Law Commission do not explicitly endorse any theory in the Report,
but the best reading of their position is as a justified-emotion version of partial excuse. They say,
e.g., that provocation requires that “the defendant’s sense of being wronged should have been
justified.” Id. at 45 (emphasis added). They do not say that the act should have been justified.
89
See our discussion in Sections IV.B. and IV.C. below.
90
McAuley’s argument rests rather squarely on the fact that mitigation manslaughter is unavailable
for the “loss of control brought on by panic or bad news, ” McAuley, Anticipating the Past, supra
note 88, at 137. Of course, this is just the starting point of the inquiry, acknowledged by all
commentators. Yet, from this observation, McAuley requires only one paragraph to reach his
conclusion: “Thus while the defence of provocation may well be a concession to the natural human
failings that are the lot of every defendant, it is submitted that its true basis is to be found in the
contribution of the victim, in the fact that his wrongful conduct was the cause of the defendant’s
violent outburst.” Id. McAuley never makes clear why the contribution by the victim is the
defense’s “true basis” given his acknowledgement that the defense is a contribution to human
frailty, and his earlier recognition “that there are natural limits to an individual’s capacity for selfcontrol which the law cannot afford to ignore.” Id. at 136. McAuley seems to rely on equating the
requirement of adequate provocation with wrongful conduct on the part of the deceased.
Provocation is adequate, says McAuley, if it “was sufficiently grave to override the ordinary
powers of human resistance.” Id. at 137. He further submits that “any conduct which is likely to
produce [a violent response] is wrong in the relevant sense.” Id. at 138. From this, McAuley
concludes that the provocation defence “implies that the defendant was partially justified in
reacting as he did because of the untoward conduct of his victim.” Id. at 139. But McAuley
provides no argument whatsoever for how or why the untoward conduct of the victim partially
justifies the defendant’s actions, which is, of course, the crucial step in establishing the theoretical
bona fides of a theory of partial justification.
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See, e.g., Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, supra note 38, at 1694, 1697; Dressler, Rethinking Heat of
Passion, supra note 34, at 458.
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provocation should, on this ground alone, be entitled to the defence.”92 Whatever
the merits or demerits of McAuley’s position as a matter of reform, to the extent
that he is purporting to provide a descriptive theory of provocation, his statement
amounts to an admission of defeat. A theory of provocation that cannot explain
the heat of passion requirement fails to describe the doctrine of provocation in its
current form. Moreover, we will argue in Section III.B that substantial
considerations do in fact support the doctrine in its current form.
3. Partial justification and partial excuse.— A handful of theorists prior us
have flirted with the idea of treating provocation as both a partial excuse and a
partial justification.93 This is not surprising, given the routine acknowledgement
by members of the academy that provocation exhibits the appearance of both
excusatory and justificatory elements.94 But even these scholars stop well short of
providing a theoretical rationale for (or even fully endorsing) provocation as partial
excuse and partial justification.95 We know of only one descriptive theory of
provocation based on the view that a provoked killing is properly considered both
partially excused and partially justified: that of English scholar Andrew
Ashworth.96 But not even Ashworth provides a comprehensive rationale for and
defense of the hybrid position.
In an article written during the provocation debate’s infancy, Ashworth
contends that “the doctrine of provocation . . . rests just as much on notions of
92

McAuley, Anticipating the Past, supra note 88. McAuley nonetheless states that, “Undoubtedly,
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have more or less worn off, is not entitled to the defence.” Id. (emphasis added). The reason for
this restriction, McAuley claims, is that the composed killer “can hardly claim that it was the
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heat of passion and adequate provocation requirements); Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators,
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See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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Lee asserts that treating a provoked killing as partially justified is “morally objectionable” and
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should not be ignored.” LEE, supra note 93, at 229. Bergelson, for her part, describes the dual
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The Law Reform Commission of Ireland has recently proposed that provocation should be
treated as containing both excusatory and justificatory elements. See The Law Reform Commission
of Ireland, Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation, LRC CP 27-2003, 141. But
the Commission argues that provocation ought to be reformed as a combination of partial excuse
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justification as upon the excusing element of loss of self-control.”97 He endorses
“the claim implicit in partial justification [] that an individual is to some extent
morally justified in making a punitive return against someone who intentionally
causes him serious offence, and that this serves to differentiate someone who is
provoked to lose his self-control and kill from the unprovoked killer.”98 Ashworth
believes the union of the two rationales “is no mere historical accident,”99 and that
the loss of either aspect would have “significant disadvantages.”100
Despite his endorsement of a dual rationale, however, Ashworth does not
give a detailed theoretical framework for the defense as both partial excuse and
partial justification. He says relatively little about what it means for an action to
be partially justified, or about how the partial excuse and partial justification
components of the rationale are reconciled. In other words, Ashworth’s article
does not address most of the reasons American scholars give for rejecting a
combined rationale for provocation – namely that excuse and justification are
mutually exclusive, and that partial justification is an incoherent notion. That
Ashworth does not address these critiques is hardly Ashworth’s fault, as his article
was written prior to those positions being advanced. The search for a legitimate
rationale for provocation did not capture the imagination of American scholars
until the early 1980s.101 More surprising is the fact that scholars on this side of the
Atlantic have largely failed to engage with Ashworth’s substantive claim. While
American authors regularly cite Ashworth’s article, they have just as regularly
failed to directly address Ashworth’s position. For example, Dressler refers to
Ashworth’s piece as “among the best English scholarly articles on provocation,”102
yet surprisingly fails to acknowledge Ashworth’s position when he rejects a “dual
rationalization of a partial defense which is both justification and excuse based.”103
Rather than engaging with Ashworth’s view, most scholars have simply repeated
the “traditional view” that partial excuse and partial justification are mutually
exclusive. The view that provocation is both a partial excuse and a partial
justification therefore remains in need of a theoretical framework, as well as in
need of refutations of the criticisms that have regularly been leveled at the view
since Ashworth’s article.
4. Rejecting the justification/excuse framework.— All the theories we have
so far addressed treat provocation as either a partial excuse or a partial
justification, in keeping with the exhaustive classification thesis. At least two
97
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theories reject this approach: Garvey’s theory of provocation as “akrasia,”104 and
Kahan and Nussbaum’s approach based on the “evaluative theory of emotion.”105
According to these views, provocation is grounded in neither justification nor
excuse.
(a) Provocation as akrasia. Garvey proposes to explain the provocation
defense by invoking the concept of weakness of will: what the ancient Greeks
referred to as akrasia. He begins by distinguishing between “two very different
ways”106 in which a person can violate an obligation imposed by the criminal law.
First, he can defy the law: he can wholeheartedly choose to commit an illegal
act,107 with “full knowledge of the law and full consent of the will.”108 Second, he
can violate a legal obligation, not by defying it, but merely as a result of weakness
of will: despite wanting to obey the law, he succumbs to temptation. He violates
the law “without wholeheartedly embracing the law-breaking desire that his will
translates into action.”109 The explanation for the provocation defense, says
Garvey, is that it “distinguish[es] actors who kill in defiance of the law from those
who do not.”110 If an actor kills in defiance of the law, he is guilty of murder. But
if he kills due to weakness of will, he is guilty only of manslaughter.111
We find Garvey’s account of provocation, though nuanced and original,
unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, the account is underspecified: Garvey does
not clearly explain why the akratic killer deserves mitigation. Second, the
explanation that appears most consistent with Garvey’s other claims, and therefore
most plausibly attributed to him, seemingly commits him to views about the inprinciple scope of appropriate mitigation that few commentators are likely to
accept. Third, insofar as Garvey and others do believe that, in principle, mitigation
should be extended far more broadly than we think it ought to be, the pragmatic
grounds he gives for limiting mitigation as a matter of doctrine are unpersuasive.
To start, Garvey does not flesh out an argument for why the akratic killer
deserves less punishment than the defiant killer. His article provides some hints as
to what the reason for mitigation might be, but none of the reasons is satisfying.
Garvey refers to the defiant actor’s “excessive pride or hubris”112—but punishing
more severely for hubris amounts to punishing character, a position Garvey
emphatically rejects.113 Alternatively, the actions of the non-defiant, ambivalent
actor might be less wrongful than the actions of the defiant actor. This could be
plausible—but only in circumstances where the actor’s ambivalence is due to
having some morally relevant reasons (other than self-interest, for instance) for
being tempted to violate the law. Garvey does not present such limits on the
circumstances of non-wholehearted lawbreaking. If he did, his account would
collapse into a theory of partial justification.
104
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Garvey comes closest to explaining why the akratic killer deserves
mitigation when he declares that, “In the end, the culpability of an actor guilty of
manslaughter consists in his failure to exercise his capacity for self-control.”114
From this perspective, Garvey’s theory seems best understood as a broad version
of partial excuse. On this view, all failed attempts to exercise self-control deserve
substantial mitigation—not merely those failures that are due to particular
circumstances that make the exercise of self-control more difficult.
If this is Garvey’s explanation for why the akratic killer deserves mitigation,
however, its implications are bracing. A violation of a duty imposed by the
criminal law is akratic if it occurs “in a moment of weakness,” if the actor has a
desire to violate the law, but also a simultaneous (but lesser) desire to conform to
the law.115 This ambivalence, we suggest, describes a large number of criminal
violations – perhaps even the majority of crimes, and certainly crimes for which
substantial mitigation is neither currently available nor, we believe, morally
deserved. Garvey’s akratic account would apply, for instance, to every thief who
steals because his desire for an object of value outweighs his weaker desire to
adhere to the law, or to every sex offender who recognizes his sexual urges are
unlawful and unsuccessfully attempts to resist them. It would apply, in short, to
every failure to resist temptation.
Perhaps, however, the mistake is ours. Perhaps all akratic intentional
killers are, in principle, entitled to the same degree of mitigation as that presently
afforded, under provocation manslaughter doctrine, to just a small subset. If so,
however, it would seem at first blush that Garvey’s analysis would amount, not to
a defense of existing doctrine, but to a repudiation of it. That is, on Garvey’s
analysis, the key features of voluntary manslaughter doctrine—namely, heat of
passion and adequate provocation—would seem indefensible, for an actor can
struggle with the competing desires to kill and to abide by the law without being
subject to either heat of passion or provoking conduct.
Garvey resists this conclusion. Acknowledging that “the passion and
adequate provocation requirements might appear superfluous,”116 he argues that
they do play a role – as “evidentiary rules.” 117 That is, the requirements of heat of
passion and adequate provocation have evidentiary, but not operative significance.
While akratic intentional killers who do not satisfy these twin requirements are, as
a class, no more blameworthy than those who do, these requirements serve to
identify (albeit imperfectly) those who are in fact akratic.
As it happens, we have considerable sympathy for the impulse to rethink
seemingly operative rules of criminal law in evidentiary terms.118 But we believe
114
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that the requirements of heat of passion and adequate provocation are such poor
proxies for the fact of akrasia as to make it radically implausible that their function
is evidentiary. Garvey argues that, “The akrasia theory denies the defense to the
inadequately provoked actor . . . because his claim to have lost self-control is
incredible.”119 In our view, the EMED case law demonstrates that this is not so:
the adequacy of provocation is an exceedingly poor proxy for whether someone
has in fact experienced substantial impairment of control.120 More importantly,
substantial impairment of control is itself a poor proxy for an akratic killing.
Consider Garvey’s own euthanasia example.121 Suppose Terminally Ill, who is
suffering enormous pain, pleads with Friend to end her life. We can easily
imagine Friend believing that killing is wrong and desiring not to do wrong, but
desiring more strongly to implement Terminally Ill’s wishes and put an end to her
suffering. A killing in these circumstances would clearly qualify as akratic, a
conclusion that seems quite easy to reach notwithstanding the absence of both heat
of passion and adequate provocation. For these reasons, then, we remain quite
skeptical of Garvey’s effort to link his akratic theory of mitigation with anything
approximating existing provocation doctrine.
(b) The evaluative conception of emotion. Dan Kahan and Martha
Nussbaum also propose a theory of provocation that rejects the categories of
justification and excuse. They rightly observe that the “most popular account”122
of provocation manslaughter is that a person who kills in anger has limited
culpability because his choice capacities have been partially undermined.123
Kahan and Nussbaum reject this orthodox account of provocation as partial excuse
for the same reasons we do. They assert that it “fails to make sense of the most
basic requirement of the common law formulation: that the defendant’s passion
arise from a provocation by the victim.”124 On a traditional theory of partial
excuse, this limitation is inexplicable because an actor’s culpability ought to be
reduced whenever his choice capacities have been impaired, regardless of the
impairment’s cause.125
Kahan and Nussbaum argue instead that provoked killers deserve
mitigation because their emotions express “cognitive appraisals” that are morally
appropriate, that reflect an appropriate evaluation of the good.126 Their account of
provocation therefore mirrors the justified emotion theories addressed above, in
which the defense is deserved when the “cognitive component” of the provoked
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killer’s anger is justified.127 Consequently, Kahan and Nussbaum’s theory has the
same fatal flaw as the justified emotion theories: it cannot account for the
requirement of heat of passion. Kahan and Nussbaum purport to explain the heat
of passion requirement by arguing that it is only when a person kills in the heat of
passion that he can be said to act on worthy motives and judgments. Without heat
of passion, they claim, “it would be impossible to understand the defendant’s act as
expressing an appropriate valuation of the good—whether it is the defendant’s
honor or the dignity or physical security of the defendant’s family members—that
is threatened by the victim’s wrongful provocation.”128
This does not ring true to us. Consider the case of Parent killing Villain,
who has murdered Parent’s child (or Kahan and Nussbaum’s similar example of a
mother who kills the man who sexually assaulted her daughter). We can imagine
Parent deciding to kill Villain precisely because she values her (or her child’s)
honor, and values the security of her family members, and perhaps also because
she values the security of Villain’s potential future victims. We can imagine a
killing for these motives, which Kahan and Nussbaum accept as worthy, even
when Parent dispassionately kills. A period of time may have passed, during
which Parent’s passion turned to grief and sorrow or fear of future attacks.
The euthanasia case of Friend killing Terminally Ill also provides a
counterexample to Kahan and Nussbaum’s claim that a person can only be said to
kill on worthy motives if they are experiencing the heat of passion. Friend has
appropriate beliefs and valuations regarding human suffering, even if Friend is not
experiencing anger or rage. On Kahan and Nussbaum’s view, it is the judgment or
evaluation expressed by rage that does all the work. Emotions do express
judgments, but the requisite worthy motives, judgments and evaluations can exist
in the absence of anger or rage. Kahan and Nussbaum’s theory therefore cannot
explain why the heat of passion is required for a defendant to benefit from the
provocation defense.
III. OUR ACCOUNT: PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION AND PARTIAL EXCUSE
So far we have considered the various theories that scholars have advanced
to explain the doctrine of provocation, and we have found each of them wanting.
The orthodox view of provocation as a partial excuse cannot account for the
doctrinal requirement of adequate provocation.
The heretical view that
provocation is a partial justification cannot explain the requirement that the killing
occur in the heat of passion. Other views that reject (or purport to reject) the
traditional justification-excuse framework either fail to explain all the elements of
provocation, or collapse into a partial justification theory, or prove implausible for
other reasons.
For our part, we accept that neither partial excuse nor partial justification
alone can account for all the central elements of the provocation doctrine. But we
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do not consequently reject partial excuse and partial justification from the field of
explaining provocation. Quite the contrary. We consider both partial excuse and
partial justification as components of the rationale underlying provocation.
The short version of our theory is this: partial excuse and partial
justification each provide independent grounds for mitigation. But the mitigation
that flows from partial excuse alone is insufficient to warrant treating an
intentional killing as manslaughter rather than murder. Ditto the mitigation that
flows purely from partial justification. However, when an intentional killing is
both partially excused and partially justified, it is appropriate to treat the killing as
manslaughter. Hence the provocation defense’s dual requirements of heat of
passion and adequate provocation: they ensure the defense is only available to
those defendants whose killing was both partially excused (because it occurred in
the heat of passion) and partially justified (because it was in response to adequate
provocation).
We present our account in stages. In the remainder of Part III, we provide
a brief description of our theory. We sketch our arguments for (1) the claim that
partial excuse and partial justification represent dual grounds for mitigation, and
(2) the claim that the provocation defense is rightly reserved for the conjunction of
partial excuse and partial justification. We elaborate on this account in Part IV, in
the course of responding to objections that the unorthodox aspects of our account
are sure to attract.
A. Dual Grounds for Mitigation
1. Less blameworthy due to emotion.—The fact that an actor who
intentionally kills another was in an inflamed emotional state, which made it more
difficult for him to conform his actions to the dictates of the balance of applicable
reasons, makes him less blameworthy than he would otherwise be. This claim is
just the common wisdom that undergirds the dominant partial-excuse position on
provocation. We shall therefore spend relatively little time defending it. But we
wish to be clear on the scope of the claim: it is a claim merely about mitigation.
We are not claiming that the fact that an actor was experiencing emotional turmoil,
without more, supports a conviction for manslaughter, or that a theory based on
partial loss of self-control explains all the elements of the doctrine of provocation.
We simply claim that the existence of emotional turmoil of a kind that undermines
the actor’s capacity to conform his actions to those dictated by the applicable
guiding reasons deserves some mitigation.
The Raguseo case provides an example. The defendant, who was
meticulous about his vehicle and parking space, became increasingly angered by
repeated unauthorized use of the space. In an argument with a man who had used
his parking space and almost hit his car, the defendant became enraged stabbed the
victim to death. However unreasonable the defendant’s rage and violence, we can
easily see that this unreasonable rage could have undermined his capacity to
control himself. He does not deserve a manslaughter conviction as a result of this.
But he does deserve some mitigation. He deserves less punishment than would be
due had he killed the victim while in full control of his rational faculties.
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An example is also provided by the infamous case of Commonwealth v.
Carr,129 in which the defendant shot two women, killing one, and claimed that he
became enraged at the sight of their “lesbian lovemaking”130 in the woods. On our
account, Carr is not entitled to a manslaughter instruction. But he is less
blameworthy than would be a close cousin who coolly and calmly kills women for
engaging in lesbian lovemaking. Let us be clear: Carr is not entitled to mitigation
relative to the “ordinary” or baseline murderer. But this is not because Carr’s loss
of control has no mitigating bearing on his blameworthiness. Carr’s loss of control
mitigates, but the cause of his loss of control – his attitude towards his victims –
exacerbates his blameworthiness. Although these things cannot be measured with
any accuracy, the net effect of the mitigating and exacerbating factors might be
that Carr deserves roughly the same punishment as the “ordinary murderer.”
Relative to the cool, collected murderer who kills lesbians out of hatred, however,
Carr does deserve lesser punishment – to some degree. That is because the cool,
collected murder is of exacerbated blameworthiness relative to the supposed norm
for the class of intentional killers,131 but does not have any offsetting mitigation
due to loss of control. Relative to that murderer, Carr’s loss of control is
(somewhat) mitigating.
The amount of punishment deserved in inadequate provocation cases,
however, is not solely a function of the extent to which his faculty of rational selfcontrol were impaired by strong emotion. We fully agree with Kahan and
Nussbaum that the evaluations that undergird the loss of self-control are also
relevant. A comparison of Carr and Raguseo illustrates this. Assuming each was
in a similarly compromised emotional state, Ragueso is less blameworthy because
his anger is rooted in excessive evaluation of his property, whereas Carr’s is rooted
in actual hatred of a class of persons.
2. Less wrongful due to reasons for acting.—The fact that an actor had a
good reason for aggressing against his victim renders an intentional killing less
wrongful that it would have been absent that reason, notwithstanding that the
killing remains wrongful on balance. Killing in response to adequate provocation
is wrong—seriously wrong, and deserving of heavy punishment. But it is less
wrong, all else being equal, than killing in the absence of provocation.
We are aware that this claim is treated as morally repugnant by many of the
critics of partial justification,132 but we believe it nonetheless true. We provide a
more rigorous rationale and defense of the claim in Part IV. For now, we provide
just the rudiments—enough to establish the claim’s plausibility.
When we refer to intentional killings for which the actor had good reason
to aggress against his victim, we mean to refer, roughly, to intentional killings in
retaliation for the types of grievous wrongs that would be uncontroversially
accepted as adequate provocation. Intentional killings of this kind remain
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wrongful. But wrongfulness admits of degrees. It is a commonplace of criminal
law and of morality that not all wrongs are created equal. Some wrongs are more
(or less) wrongful than others. The complex schemas of stratified punishments for
different criminal offenses reflect this basic fact that wrongs vary in degree.
That an intentional killing was in response to a grievous wrong is one of
the factors that render it less wrongful. To illustrate the point, recall the case of
Parent. Parent discovers that Villain has murdered Parent’s child, and intentionally
kills Villain. Parent’s killing of Villain is wrong, but it is less wrong than, say, a
garden-variety killing for financial gain. We suspect most readers’ intuitions will
concur on this. Parent’s action is less wrong precisely because of Parent’s reasons
for killing Villain—reasons that issue from the fact that Villain had seriously
wronged Parent by killing Parent’s child. Note that these reasons (whatever,
precisely, they may be)133 are independent of Parent’s emotional state. They apply
both in cases where Parent kills while (understandably) in a state of great anger
and emotional turmoil, and in cases where parent kills coolly and calmly. In order
to properly isolate the reasons why Parent’s killing is less wrong (and to avoid the
possibility that our intuitive reactions are unduly colored by assuming that Parent
is in emotional turmoil), let us refine the circumstances we are presenting.
Suppose Parent coolly kills Villain two years after Villain’s killing of Child and
after having painstakingly tracked him across the country. Surely we would say
that such a killing, while wrong—and perhaps so wrong that Parent ought to be
convicted of murder—is nevertheless less wrong than it would be had Villain not
subjected Parent (or Parent’s child) to a grievous wrong. It is less wrong than a
killing of Villain by some unrelated third party. And it is less wrong than was
Villain’s killing of Child. Surely we would say that Parent deserves a lesser
sentence as a consequence of her reason for killing Villain. The fact that Villain
killed Parent’s child provided Parent with reasons to retaliate against Villain, and
those reasons lessened (without eliminating) the wrongfulness of Parent’s killing
of Villain.
If this is the correct understanding of cases of this sort, then the actor’s
reason for killing partially reduces the wrongfulness of the killing. But recall that
a reason which completely reduces the wrongfulness of an action (that is, that
renders the act not wrongful) is a justification. It therefore seems sensible to
characterize a reason that merely reduces the wrongfulness of an act as a partial
justification, and to characterize the less wrongful act as partially justified. In Part
IV, we will consider at length a number of arguments to the effect that the notion
of partial justification is incoherent. We believe these arguments are flawed, or at
the very least, overstated. But there is nothing magical about the language of
partial justification. Our substantive point is that adequately provoked killings are
less wrong than those that are not so provoked.
B. The Conjunction Requirement.
If what we have said so far is correct—that partial excuse and partial
justification each independently provide mitigation—the next task is to explain
why provocation should require both elements. Why shouldn’t heat of passion and
133
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adequate provocation each be sufficient, instead of necessary, conditions for
provocation, at least so long as the mitigating force of either is adequate, in the
particular case, to reach some threshold? We provide two explanations. We call
the first response the “additive-proxy account,” and the second the “expressivedeterrent account.” They are not mutually exclusive.
1. The additive-proxy account.—A defendant who intentionally killed
under conditions that give rise to a partial excuse—when his emotional turmoil
substantially interfered with his capacity for self-control—merits some amount of
mitigation. A defendant who intentionally killed in conditions that give rise to a
justification—he was grievously wronged and so had reason to retaliate—also
deserves a degree of mitigation. But what should we say of the defendant who was
subject to both excusing conditions and justifying conditions?134 Surely we should
say that such a defendant deserves more mitigation than he would if only the
partially-excusing condition or partially-justifying condition applied. That is, the
mitigation that flows from partial excuse and partial justification is cumulative.
In general, the mitigation due a defendant whose conduct is partly excused
will be insufficient to warrant such a reduction in penalty that would result from a
conviction of manslaughter rather than murder. The same applies to a defendant
whose conduct is partly justified. In each case, some mitigation in sentencing will
be appropriate, but the sentence should nonetheless be higher than the maximum
sentence available for manslaughter in most states. The Table we have included as
an Appendix lists the sentence ranges for murder and provocation manslaughter in
each of the fifty states. As this Table shows, jurisdictions have adopted widely
varying sentencing ranges for both manslaughter and murder. Nonetheless, in the
majority of states the maximum penalty for manslaughter is less than or equal to
the minimum penalty available for murder (and often less by a large margin).135 In
almost all jurisdictions, a manslaughter conviction lowers both the floor and the
ceiling of available punishment by a significant degree from that available for a
murder conviction. As a general matter, a defendant who has intentionally killed
will only deserve a sentence in this lower range if the killing was both partially
excused and partially justified.
We can readily make sense of the cumulative mitigating effect of partial
justification and partial excuse. A partial justification reduces the wrongfulness of
an action, and a partial excuse reduces the degree of blame the actor deserves for
134
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the (less wrongful) conduct. Each of these reductions affects the amount of
punishment the actor deserves. Consider once again the case of Parent. We have
already contended that if Parent kills Villain calmly and deliberately, he has
committed a lesser wrong and so deserves less punishment than if he did not have
this reason for killing Villain. Now consider the case in which Parent sees Villain
murder his child, and kills Villain in a fit of extreme rage. We should surely say
that Parent deserves less punishment in this case than in the case where Parent kills
while in full control of his rational faculties.
This strikes us as a plausible way to view partial justification and partial
excuse. Intuitively, it seems correct that, ceteris paribus, a partially justified
killing in the heat of passion deserves less punishment than a partially justified
killing that is coldly deliberate, and also less punishment than an entirely
unjustified killing committed in the heat of extreme reason-clouding passion.
While Dressler has described this approach as “torturous,”136 we think it
quite natural. There is something quite common-sensical about the idea that an
actor with both a partial excuse and a partial justification deserves some mitigation
as a result of each. The results of this structure or reasoning conform to our
intuitions about which intentional killings deserve greater mitigation than others,
i.e. about which intentional killings deserve enough mitigation to warrant the
substantially lower range of penalties available for manslaughter. The dual
requirements of provocation—heat of passion and adequate provocation—deny
this lower penalty range both to the person who exacts cold-blooded revenge for a
grievous wrong and the person who kills in genuine heat of passion triggered by a
trivial slight. In each of these cases, some mitigation in sentencing is warranted,
but not that associated with the lesser offense of manslaughter.
The better objection to a doctrine that limits provocation manslaughter to
cases in which the defendant not only had some good reason to do as he did (but
not, we emphasize again, “good reason” all things considered) but was also in an
emotional state that substantially interfered with his ability to conform his conduct
to the balance of reasons, does not deny that partial justification and partial excuse
can aggregate in the way we have just described. Rather, it questions why the
criminal law should require that each type of mitigation be present instead of
demanding only that some specified quantum of mitigation be satisfied, while
allowing that that total might be reached by excusatory considerations alone,
partially justifying considerations alone, or an aggregation of the two.
We do not deny that partial excuses and partial justifications vary in
degree, and that in some extreme cases either basis of mitigation alone would
diminish the actor’s blameworthiness as much as, or even more than, do the two
forms of mitigation combined in a typical case of provocation manslaughter. To
make this concrete, consider the Australian case of Scriva.137 The defendant in that
case saw his child seriously injured by an automobile driver. In the heat of
passion, the defendant attacked the driver. When a bystander intervened, the
defendant intentionally stabbed him. Dressler argues that the defendant was
136
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“sufficiently enraged or otherwise overwrought” to deserve to be punished for
manslaughter only.138 We do not deny that a manslaughter-level sentence might be
entirely appropriate on the facts of Scriva.
The short response to the objection, however, is that legal doctrine need
not, and frequently does not, perfectly correspond to its underlying moral
considerations.139 Cases (perhaps including Scriva) where the requisite degree of
mitigation could be realized as a result only of partial excuse—or only from partial
justification—will be rare. In most cases where a defendant is sufficiently enraged
to warrant a manslaughter sentence, for example, he will also have some reason
that partially justifies his actions. In the vast majority of cases where the only
mitigating condition is partial excuse, the defendant will not warrant a sentence in
the manslaughter range. The combination of partial justification and partial excuse
is a decent proxy for the level of mitigation that warrants such a lower sentence. It
is therefore sensible for the law to require both, even at the expense of some
underinclusiveness.
This is especially true because an alternative approach that would more
perfectly track the moral analysis would incur real costs. To start, there is the
formidable legal drafting problem of trying to articulate the total quantum of
mitigation required to move from murder to manslaughter. Furthermore, allowing
partial excuse alone to suffice for manslaughter runs the opposite risk of allowing
partially-excused intentional killers to be punished too lightly. We have in mind
cases such as Commonwealth v. Carr,140 killings in response to homosexual
advance,141 and multitude of cases of intimate homicide in which the victim has
done little or nothing to provoke the attack.142 Indeed, we suggest that the
tendency for provocation arguments to succeed in such cases is partly caused by
too much emphasis having been placed on the partial excuse dimension of
provocation, at the expense of the requirement of partial justification. As a result
there has been a trend towards the partial loss of self-control aspect of provocation
overshadowing the requirement of adequate provocation. The Model Penal Code
is part of this trend, with the partial justification aspect of the provocation defense
minimized (if not eliminated) in its EMED incarnation. As Nourse has effectively
demonstrated, this has resulted in the EMED defense being more often
successfully argued in undeserving cases of intimate violence than its common law
predecessor.
2. The expressive-deterrent account.—Another approach views each
element of provocation as necessary, but not simply because they combine to
provide a sufficient magnitude of mitigation. On this approach, heat of passion
and adequate provocation are both necessary, but for different reasons. Adequate
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provocation is required for expressive reasons, while heat of passion is required
principally for reasons of deterrence.
This perspective emphasizes—and helps to explain—an element of the
provocation defense to which we have paid relatively little attention until now.
Provocation is a partial defense: it does not merely provide for sentencing
mitigation, nor even result in a lesser degree of murder. It does not simply support
a range of punishment with lower maximums and minimums. The provocation
doctrine carves out a separate offense—voluntary manslaughter—for expressive
reasons. Sentence aside, a murder conviction expresses a greater degree of moral
condemnation than a conviction for manslaughter.143
It is plausible to think that manslaughter is meant to mark conduct that is
different in kind from murder.144 A defendant who intentionally kills with great
partial excuse, but without good reason (i.e. without adequate provocation), might
deserve significantly reduced punishment. But that is because he is less to blame
for an act that is no less wrongful than a paradigm murder. His intentional killing
is not a different type of—that is, less wrongful—act. His partially-excusing
condition does not alter the quality of his act, just the degree to which he is to
blame for it. By imposing the stigma of “murder” on a partially-excused
intentional killing, the law maintains its maximum expressive condemnation of the
act of intentionally killing (without substantial supporting reasons), while the
mitigation the defendant deserves is provided by imposing a sentence at the very
low end of the range available for murder.145 By providing a different offense
category that carries less stigma—that communicates a lesser degree of
condemnation—when the defendant is adequately provoked, the law
communicates that the relevant conduct itself is less wrongful.
But if the category of manslaughter corresponds to less wrongful killings,
and less wrongfulness is established by the existence of adequate provocation, then
why does the provocation defense also require that the killing occur in the heat of
passion? The answer to this question draws out the asymmetry of this approach.
Heat of passion is required for different reasons than adequate provocation. While
the latter is required for expressive reasons, the former is required principally for
reasons of deterrence. A lesser offense of manslaughter with only the requirement
143
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of adequate provocation runs the risk of incentivizing retaliatory killing. A person
who has been grievously wronged may make the cold cost-benefit calculation that
conviction for manslaughter (and the accompanying lesser punishment) is a price
he’s willing to pay in order to exact vengeance on his wrongdoer. The case of
Ellie Nesler provides a telling illustration. Nesler fatally shot the man accused of
molesting her son while the man sat in a California court.146 The California judge
in her trial found that “she had known the penalty for manslaughter before she
killed [the victim] and had been prepared to accept it.”147 Such reasoning is far
less likely if a partial justification, by itself, is relevant only to mitigate a sentence
for murder. Even if the minimum sentence is as low as, or lower than, the
maximum for manslaughter, a wronged person contemplating killing in retaliation
could not guarantee that he will receive a sentence at the low end of the murder
range. The applicable punishment therefore remains a punishment for wrongful
conduct, rather than merely the price of acting in a certain way. Restricting
manslaughter to situations in which both partial excuse and partial justification
apply ensures that those who are unable to convince a factfinder that they killed in
the heat of passion will not have their possible punishment capped at the maximum
sentence available for manslaughter, and therefore would risk a substantially
greater punishment.148
To restate this latter point, the criminal justice system is, in its fundamental
self-conception, a system of sanctions, not prices—that is, a system that threatens
and imposes penalties for prohibited conduct, rather than exacting charges for
permitted conduct.149 While it is true that the system’s addressees sometimes treat
the threatened sanctions as mere prices (this is a problem that bedevils corporate
criminal law, for example), that is an inversion that the penal department of the
legal system cannot condone. The limitation of manslaughter, with its reduced
maximum penalties and its less condemnatory expressive force, to cases in which
provoked killers act in the heat of passion and not as a result of a cool cost-benefit
calculation, is necessary to help maintain the integrity of criminal law as a
prohibitory and condemnatory system of social control.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND ELABORATION
The partial excuse aspect of our account reflects common wisdom about
provocation manslaughter. The novelty of our account concerns the role we assign
to what we call partial justification. We expect, therefore, that most objections to
our account will target that aspect of our theory. In this Part, we consider three
potential objections: first, that justifications and excuses are mutually exclusive
146
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and therefore cannot be combined in the fashion we propose; second, that the
notion of partial justification is incoherent or misguided; and third, that to
intentionally kill someone in the face even of extraordinary provocation is not less
wrongful than to intentionally kill someone absent such provocation.
To each of these three objections we offer a different type of response. The
mutual exclusivity objection, we argue, is just plain mistaken. There are no good
reasons to doubt that a doctrine of the criminal law can combine elements of both
justification and excuse. Somewhat more can be said to support resistance to the
concept of partial justification. Nonetheless, we will argue that there are good
reasons to favor it. More importantly, though, we also explain that absolutely
nothing of substance about our account would be lost were that particular
nomenclature abandoned. The substance and originality of our account are fully
preserved if the notion of “lesser wrongfulness” is substituted for that of “partial
justification.” Finally, in support of our contention that the adequately-provoked
killing is less wrongful than it would be absent the provocation, ceteris paribus, we
offer something in the spirit of what Robert Nozick termed a “philosophical
explanation.” 150 That is, we do not present an argument that purports to decisively
establish that such a killing is less wrongful. Rather, we give an explanation of
how such a killing could be less wrongful. In other words, we set out what
propositions both about the nature of wrongfulness and about the reasons for
killing under provocation could be true that would vindicate our claim. We
anticipate that many readers (most, we hope) will find this explanation congenial
and probable. But we offer no arguments to bludgeon into acceptance those who
do not. Instead, we suggest, such readers have reason to reject standard
provocation manslaughter doctrine, either by scrapping it altogether or replacing it
with rules that are better understood purely in the nature of partial excuse, like the
MPC’s doctrine of “extreme mental or emotional distress,” broadly understood and
applied. The final section of this Part highlights additional aspects or implications
of our account that warrant explicit attention.
A. Partial Justifications and Partial Excuses are Not Mutually Exclusive
Despite the appearance of both partial-justification- and partial-excuserelated criteria in the doctrine of provocation, criminal law scholars have
overwhelmingly been reluctant to treat provocation as a combination of partial
justification and partial excuse.151 Many considerations contribute to this
reluctance, but the single factor with greatest explanatory force, we believe, is the
widespread belief that justification and excuse are mutually exclusive. As Doug
Husak recently declared, “[c]riminal law theorists believe—with almost no
exception” that justifications are incompatible with excuses.152 Notice that this is a
claim about the compatibility of complete justification and complete excuse, not
about the compatibility of partial justification and partial excuse. A great deal of
mistaken thinking about provocation has flowed from insufficient attention being
paid to the difference between the claim that the complete defenses are mutually
exclusive, and the claim that the partial defenses are mutually exclusive. Only the
latter claim is incompatible with our account of provocation as a combination of
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partial justification and partial excuse. But perhaps due to a failure to fully
appreciate the consequences of the move from complete to partial defenses, the
bulk of provocation theorists simply cite the claim that complete excuse and
justification are incompatible as the reason why provocation cannot be explained
by a combination of partial excuse and partial justification.153 That is, the mutual
exclusivity of partial justification and partial excuse is treated as synonymous
with, or at least entailed by, the mutual exclusivity of complete justification and
excuse. As it happens, there are good reasons to be skeptical even of the
widespread belief that complete justification and excuse are incompatible.154 But
even if we assume arguendo that complete excuse and justification are mutually
exclusive, it is not the case that the partial defenses are mutually exclusive. The
considerations upon which the incompatibility of the complete excuses is founded
simply do not apply to partial defenses.
Complete excuse and justification are considered mutually exclusive
because the existence of wrongdoing is taken to be a necessary component of
excuse, and justification entails that no wrong has been done. Mutual exclusivity
is routinely written into the definitions of justification and excuse. J.L. Austin,
who started the whole Sisyphean ball rolling, stated that to claim a justification is
to “accept responsibility but deny that it was bad.”155 To plead an excuse is to
“admit that it was bad but [not to] accept responsibility.”156 The phalanx of
scholars that has since addressed the issue have followed Austin’s lead, at least to
the extent of uniformly defining excuses as admitting that there was wrongful
conduct (as variously conceptualized), but denying responsibility. Dressler speaks
for the general view, then, in his oft-cited passage framing the mutual exclusivity
of justification and excuse as a definitional matter: “It must be remembered that
ordinarily a defense cannot properly be viewed simultaneously as a justification
and an excuse because the latter, by definition, admits to the existence of social
harm.”157
153
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But while fully justified conduct is not wrongful (or not criminal, or not
warranted or permissible, depending on your conception of justification), partially
justified conduct is wrongful. It is less wrongful than the same conduct would be
were the justifying condition not present, but it is still all-things-considered wrong.
And since it is all-things-considered wrong, there is no contradiction involved in
claiming either a partial or complete excuse in addition to a partial justification –
because claiming a partial justification admits to the existence of a wrong (albeit a
lesser wrong than in the absence of the partial justification).
Imperfect self-defense provides an example outside the realm of
provocation. Suppose a person is confronted with an attack involving signification
but non-deadly force, and responds in defense with unreasonable and
disproportionate force, killing his attacker.
This is plausibly understood as
conduct that is partially justified.158 Invoking our conception of partial
justification, we would say that the defender had a reason to act as he did (to avoid
being significantly harmed), but had weightier reasons not to act as he did (the
obligation not to kill outweighs his legitimate interest in protecting himself from
harm substantially less than death). His conduct was not (on the whole) warranted
or justified, but it was partially justified. This accords with our intuitions that such
conduct is wrongful homicide, but of less gravity than a premeditated killing for
financial gain.
Given the residual wrongfulness of partially justified conduct, there is no
contradiction in also claiming an excuse, either partial or complete. Suppose our
killer in excessive self-defense is insane. It is perfectly coherent for him to raise
self-defense as a complete excuse in order to avoid blame for the (lesser or
residual) wrongfulness of his conduct. She would be fully excused in relation to
this (lesser) wrong.
A possible response at this juncture would be to point out that, if the
defendant has a complete excuse, there is no need to claim a partial justification
because the complete excuse will preclude liability even for a charge not
ameliorated by the partial justification.159 But this response is not available to
deny combining partial justification with partial excuse. Imagine that our
defendant who killed using excessive force in self-defense was beside himself with
rage at the time: the violent but non-deadly attack occurred during an extremely
heated argument. Let us assume that this rage did in fact interfere with his
capacity to exercise self-control, and this contributed to the excessiveness of his
response. We now have both partially justifying and partially excusing conditions
present. Though partially justified, his conduct was still wrong (but less wrong
than had there been no attack at all). And though partially excused from blame for
his wrong conduct, he is still partially to blame for this wrongful conduct. It
involves no contradiction to say that partial justification reduces the wrongfulness
of the conduct, and also that partial excuse reduces the degree of blame for the
158

See Rozelle, Controlling Passion, supra note 9, at 255.
Husak responds wryly to the argument from need: “We should not be too quick to conclude that
persons cannot have a given kind of defense simply because they do not need one. I may need my
umbrella only if it rains, but I have one nonetheless. Why can’t excuses be like umbrellas?”
Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, supra note 134, at 567.
159

37

(residual or comparatively lesser) conduct. As we argued in Part III.B., the
mitigation associated with partial justification and partial excuse is cumulative.
As the concepts of partial excuse and justification are not inherently (or
necessarily, or conceptually) incompatible, some further argument is required to
justify dismissing out of hand a combined rationale for the provocation defense.
We know of no such additional arguments other than those that reject the notion of
partial justification – arguments to which we now turn.
B. Partial Justification is a Coherent Notion
A common reason for rejecting a combined rationale in favor of an excuse
theory of provocation is the view that the notion of partial justification is either
incoherent or morally repugnant. As such, partial justification can neither play a
role in a combined rationale for provocation, nor provide a rationale for
provocation in its own right. The only remaining option, so this thinking goes, is
that provocation is a partial excuse. Hence the result that partial excuse has
become the dominant rationale for provocation.
The arguments for rejecting partial justification fall into two categories,
with the second group consisting of two sub-categories. First, theorists have
asserted that the concept of partial justification is incoherent. Second, the various
conceptions of partial justification160 have been criticized as either (a) conceptually
contradictory, or (b) morally insupportable.
1. Partial justification as a contradiction in terms.—Many scholars have
asserted that “partial justification” is a contradiction in terms. Justification on this
view is like a light switch: it is either on or off. Something is either justified or it
isn’t. As justification is a binary concept, admitting of no degrees, it makes no
sense to say that conduct is partially justified. Garvey provides a recent example
of this position:
The concept of a “partial justification” is puzzling. A justified action
is usually understood to mean an action one is (at least) permitted to
do, and any particular action can be described as either permissible or
impermissible. But it makes no sense to say a particular action is
“partially permitted”. The logic of permission is all-or-nothing.161
Greenawalt has expressed similar concerns: “The conceptual difficulty is that the
term justification has an either-or quality that makes people hesitant to speak of a
partial justification when no aspect of the action is fully justified.”162The
conceptual difficulty is overstated. To be sure, the term “justification”—when
unmodified—has an either-or quality. This does not entail, however, that
modifying the term amounts to contradicting it. The unmodified terms “full” and
160
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“empty” have an either-or quality about them: to say a vessel is “full” is to declare
it completely full; to say a vessel is “empty” is to declare it completely empty. The
logic of fullness and emptiness, it seems, is quite literally all-or-nothing. Yet
people are not at all hesitant to refer to a glass as either half-full or half-empty.
Nor do we have any difficulty understanding what is meant by these phrases when
they’re uttered.163
The same point can be made regarding the term “wrong.” When wielded
without modification, “wrong” has a binary connotation. But no-one would deny
that the concept of wrongfulness admits of degrees.164 Wrongful actions can `be
more and less wrongful.
2. Uniacke and the Incoherence of Partial Justification.—At the risk of
belaboring the point more than half to death, we ought to directly address the
position of Suzanne Uniacke. She is the scholar most regularly cited as advocating
the view that the concept of partial justification is incoherent,165 and her position
on partial justification is both nuanced and interesting. Uniacke states that, “I do
not think that the concept of a partial justification for a particular act or offense
makes sense.”166 At the same time, she admits that “Justification can be a matter
of degree.”167 How does Uniacke reconcile these two claims?
On Uniacke’s view, when we choose between labeling an action “justified”
or “unjustified,” we make an overall evaluation of that act.168 If an act is justified,
it can be more or less justified. That is, among the set of overall-justified act, some
are better—more justified—than others. (One may be justified in repelling an
unwanted kiss from a persistent would-be paramour by either pushing him away or
slapping him on the cheek. But, if pushing him away will get the message across,
this is more justified than slapping him.)
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However, all unjustified acts are simply that—unjustified. Uniacke’s point
seems to be that while justification can be a matter of degree, unjustification
cannot.169 Moreover, calling an act “partially justified,” according to Uniacke,
expresses the judgment that the act falls within the set of overall justified acts. But
acts to which the provocation defense applies are overall unjustified. So, to call
provoked killings partially justified is to contradict the law’s overall assessment of
such killings as wrong, and deserving of serious punishment.
This is a plausible view of the linguistic implications of “justified” and
“unjustified.” However, it is not the only plausible view. It is also plausible to
view “partially justified” as indicating that an act is supported by some good
reasons, but not enough to make the act overall justified. But we feel no need to
insist that our linguistic preferences should trump those of Uniacke and others.
We believe the term “partially justified” is a particularly efficacious way of
describing the moral status of provoked killings, but “less wrong” also suffices.
Nothing of substance in our position turns in this change in nomenclature, and
nothing in Uniacke’s approach denies that overall-unjustified acts can be more or
less wrong.
3. Conceptions of Partial Justification.—The arguments we have just
addressed purport to establish that the concept of partial justification is incoherent.
We have shown that there are reasons to reject these arguments. But it is also
worth noting that these arguments are primarily linguistic. Because of this, the
thrust of the arguments is easily parried by simply replacing the term “partially
justified” with “less wrongful.” Nothing of substance is lost as a result of the
change in nomenclature.
Another approach used to reject partial justification is to argue that the
particular conceptions advanced to explain partial justification in the context of
provocation cannot be supported. Dressler, the chief antagonist of provocation as
partial justification, identifies three theories that have been advanced to explain
partial justification: (i) the “rights theory”; (ii) the “forfeiture theory”; and (iii) the
“lesser harm” theory. He argues that each of them fails—either because they are
conceptually incoherent, or because they are morally unacceptable.170 Dressler
approaches the task of identifying theories of partial justification by first isolating
the theories that have been posited as explaining full justification, and then
considering when these theories are translated into partial defenses.
According to the rights theory, “it is sometimes morally justifiable to
enforce a legal and moral right by taking the life of another.”171 This is at least
plausible as a rationale for self-defense: you are entitled to enforce your right to
life by taking the life of your attacker.172 As a basis for partial justification
169
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Dressler criticizes this theory on two counts. First, whatever right is being
protecting when one is provoked is less than the right to life, as ex hypothesi one’s
life is not endangered by the provoking conduct (else one could avail oneself of
self-defense). It must be some lesser right being protected, in which case it is
difficult to see why one is morally entitled to take another’s life (and so violate a
greater right). As Dressler puts it, “it should certainly come as a surprise to us that
such a right entitles the actor to take a human life to enforce it.”173
Dressler’s second criticism is that, if the actor has a right that he is entitled
to enforce by killing his provoker, we are left with a puzzle as to why provocation
is a partial rather than a complete defense.174 The same criticism has been leveled
at the so-called partial-right doctrine of imperfect self-defense, namely that to say
someone has a partial right is a contradiction in terms.175 Dressler therefore claims
that, as a rationale for the partial defense of provocation, the “rights theory” is both
a conceptual and moral failure.
We feel no desire to defend the rights thesis. It suffices to point out that
our theory of partial justification indeed denies that the adequately provoked
person has the right to kill. He does not have such a right, which is why he is
guilty of murder—or of manslaughter, if he is also partially excused. His wrongful
conduct (in which he violates the right to life of his provocateur) is simply less
wrongful than it would have been had he not been supplied with some reasons to
kill as a result of the provocation.176
Whereas the “rights theory” proposes that the killer has a right to kill the
“forfeiture theory” proposes that the victim does not have the right to life. The
victim forfeits his life by choosing to engage in wrongful conduct, and so no
wrong is done by killing him. 177 In the context of provocation, the argument is
that adequate provocation is a wrong (and often a legal wrong) that amounts to a
forfeiture of the provoking agent’s right not to be killed. The forfeiture theory, as
a basis for partial justification, has a symmetrical conceptual problem to that
encountered by the rights theory: it “should serve to make the defense
complete,”178 not partial. Either the victim forfeited his right not to be killed, or he
did not.179 It makes no sense to say that the provoking agent forfeited part of his
right.
Once again, we need not argue this point with Dressler. Our theory of
partial justification does not entail a claim that the defendant forfeits any part of
his right. A person who kills in response to adequate provocation, even in the heat
of passion, violates his victim’s rights; his action is not all-things-considered
justified. Our position is that the circumstances in which the violation of a right
173
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occurs can affect the moral gravity of that violation. One of the circumstances that
affect the gravity of a right violation is the degree of intent. A premeditated killing
is a greater wrong than a negligent killing, even though they involve violation of
the same right—the right not to be killed—and violation to the same degree, qua
right. (The negligently killed victim is just as dead as the intentionally killed
victim.) Another of the factors that affect the gravity of a right violation is a
worthy motive, such as retaliation for the murder or sexual assault of a loved one.
The provoking agent has not forfeited any rights, but the killer’s violation of those
rights is less grave than it would otherwise have been in the absence of the reasons
provided by the provoker’s conduct.
According to the “lesser harm” theory, killing a person who has done the
killer a serious moral wrong involves less “social harm” than killing an innocent
person.180 As the killing causes less harm, it is less wrong. For Dressler, this is
the “basic” theory of justification: “The basic theory of justification is that if an
act is justified there has been no social harm, or, at least, less social harm than if
the actor did not act as he did.”181
Unlike in response to the rights and forfeiture theories, Dressler does not
assert that a partial defense on this theory would involve a contradiction. Rather,
he acknowledges that the theory is conceptually coherent,182 and even suggests that
the theory has considerable intuitive force in explaining provocation.183 Dressler
rejects the lesser harm theory on the basis that it is morally unacceptable. A
person’s bad conduct should not make his life less valuable than that of an
innocent person: “Are we to say that immoral conduct, albeit non-life endangering,
should make a person’s life less deserving of society’s protection? Such a position
runs counter to most common law theories of criminal culpability.”184
The moral dangers associated with suggesting the victim deserved to be
killed have struck a chord with writers concerned that the provocation doctrine
reinforces beliefs that members of some groups are less worthy than the
mainstream. Hence Rozelle suggests that calling provocation a partial justification
“smacks of ‘blame the victim’.”185 Similarly Mison worries that framing
provocation as a partial justification in cases of homosexual advance expresses the
notion that the life of a homosexual man is worth less than that of a heterosexual
man.186
Once again, the appropriate response to this argument is to point out that
the lesser harm theory is merely one conception of partial justification. A theory
of partial justification does not necessarily entail the view that the victim’s life is
less valued, or is a lesser social harm. It may be that, ceteris paribus, if conduct
causes less harm, then the conduct is less wrongful. But it does not follow that if
180
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conduct is less wrongful, then it must have caused less harm. Accidental killing is
less wrongful than intentional killing, but the harm is the same.187 The victim of
an accidental killing neither less valuable, nor more deserving of death, than the
victim of an intentional homicide.
The harm that an actor intends or anticipates is certainly an important
factor in determining the degree of wrongfulness of that conduct. But it is not the
only factor. One of the other contributing factors is the set of reasons upon which
conduct is based. Once again, the arguments Dressler marshals against this
particular theory of partial justification do not apply to our conception of partial
justification.
In summary, first, none of the arguments so far advanced demonstrate that
the concept of partial justification is incoherent. Second, none of the arguments
that particular conceptions of partial justification are either incoherent or morally
unacceptable apply to the theory of partial justification on which we rely, that of
partially warranting reasons. Third, no one appears to have even attempted to
critique this theory as it applies to partial justification. Therefore, no sufficient
argument has been advanced to support the view that partial justification cannot
form part of the rationale of the provocation defense.
C. Provocation Renders an Intentional Killing Less Wrongful
As we observed above, wrongfulness is a scalar, not merely a binary,
property. We take this to be common ground. Nobody, say, who believes that
shoplifting or hurling a gratuitous insult is wrongful believes that either is as
wrongful as rape or murder. Nobody believes that pick-pocketing is as wrongful
as genocide. Importantly, nothing that we have said or contemplated in Section
III.B. is to the contrary. Rejection of the concept of partial justification, as we
explained above, rests on the idea that conduct is either wrongful or not and that
justified conduct is not wrongful.188 But this idea does not entail that wrongfulness
does not admit of degrees. It does not insist that each wrongful act is precisely as
wrongful as every other wrongful act. So we will accept as a given that, within the
universe of wrongful conduct, particular acts can be more or less wrongful than
others.
Against this background premise, to fully establish that provoked
intentional killings can be less wrongful, in virtue of the provocation, than
unprovoked intentional killings, we need to do two things. First, we need to
provide and defend a general theoretical account of the determinants of the degree
of wrongfulness of wrongful conduct. Second, we need to provide a specific
187
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account of how killing in response to provocation satisfies the criteria made
relevant by our general account. That is a very tall order indeed, for this first step
would require that we detail and defend something close to a full moral theory, or
a full account of practical reasoning. (Consider to begin with that consequentialist
and nonconsequentialist moral theories are committed to different positions
regarding the considerations (1) in virtue of which conduct is wrongful and (2) that
determine the magnitude of a wrong. Likewise, different theories within each of
these two broad ethical families are apt to supply different answers.) Accordingly,
we cannot tackle in this paper the daunting task of establishing that the lesser
wrongfulness thesis is true across diverse moral theories.
Instead, our plan of attack in this section is to sketch the rudiments of a
general account of wrongfulness and to offer reasons, consistent with that general
account, to believe that an intentional killing is less wrongful when in response to
adequate provocation. (We will not try to demarcate the contours of the class of
adequate provocations, contenting ourselves in this section to argue that it is a nonnull set.) We will then consider objections to this account—objections that must
themselves be consistent with the thesis that wrongfulness has variable magnitude
or weight—and explain why we find them unpersuasive. If this leaves us some
distance short of having proven that intentional homicide is less wrongful when
responsive to (adequate) provocation, it should nonetheless establish why one
might reasonably think so, and thus might well explain the provocation doctrine
even if it does not (as we believe it does) defend it.
1. Affirmative Account.—Let us start with some remarks about wrongful
conduct or wrongdoing (terms that we will treat as synonymous) that, while not
uncontroversial in all particulars, are well within orthodox thinking. Morality is
concerned with guiding behavior and providing the basis for a certain type of
criticism. Moral reasons are the subset of all reasons that concern the regard we
ought to pay the interests of others, what T.M. Scanlon calls “what we owe to each
other.”189 One ought to act in accordance with the balance of nonexcluded
reasons. (In the Razian account of practical reason, the broad outlines of which we
follow here, exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons not to act on certain
first-order reasons. So, for example, the fact that A has promised to attend B’s
party on Saturday night excludes or preempts, and does not merely outweigh, some
of what would otherwise be perfectly acceptable reasons for A to pursue activities
on Saturday night that are incompatible with his attendance at B’s party.)190 One
acts wrongfully if he acts against the direction of applicable moral reasons that are
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not themselves outweighed or excluded by other applicable reasons, moral or
otherwise.
The nature, character, and constituents of wrongdoing are, of course,
central concerns of moral philosophy. Moral philosophers have paid less attention,
however, to questions regarding the magnitudes of wrongdoings. (Perhaps this
should not surprise: if moral reasoning directs that  would be wrong, then it ought
not be done, and the separate questions of how wrong it is, and therefore how much
it ought not be done might strike some as rather beside the point.) But insofar as
wrongdoing itself is in some sense the upshot or consequence of a balancing of
reasons, it seems plausible to suppose that the magnitude of wrongful action is a
function of the extent to which the nonexcluded moral reasons against it outweigh
or outdistance the nonexcluded reasons in its favor. Take again the case of
promising. Suppose that A stays home Saturday night because his child is ill.
Caring for an ill child, we suppose, is a reason not to attend the party that the
promise does not exclude. But that does not necessarily mean that staying home is
morally permissible all things considered or even that it is morally permissible
against the moral reasons created by the fact of his promise. If, say, the child’s
illness is minor and another responsible adult is available to care for her, then the
reason for A to keep his promise might render his decision to stay home wrongful.
Nonetheless, because he does have a good reason to stay home, his staying home is
less wrongful than it would have been had he stayed home to watch a television
program he enjoys or merely because he felt unsociable.
If that sketch of the nature and magnitude of wrongdoing is fundamentally
correct, then it remains only to determine whether there exist types of wrongdoing
in which an actor might engage that would give another person reason(s) to kill
her, which reason(s) are insufficient to prevent the killing from being wrongful but
sufficient to reduce its wrongfulness by an amount that would warrant recognition
from the legal system. We believe that an affirmative answer is exemplified by
Villain’s intentional killing of Parent’s child. In a case such as this, we think that,
ordinarily, Parent has such reason to kill Villain.
That this is so might emerge more clearly if we first assume something
approximating the state of nature, or at least a state with a notably ineffectual
criminal justice apparatus. Here, most of the reasons customarily invoked to
justify state punishment—and capital punishment in particular—seem to provide
reasons for Parent to kill Villain: e.g., to give Villain what he deserves (for those
who believe that one deserves to suffer, or to be punished, on account of his
blameworthy wrongdoing); to prevent Villain from victimizing other innocent
persons; to deter similar acts of aggression by others; and to express the
appropriate degree of moral outrage toward Villain’s actions, an outrage that,
punishment skeptics notwithstanding, might be hard to express in other than pallid
form through other means. Furthermore, Parent has special agent-relative reason
to be the author of Villain’s punishment, either to satisfy an obligation of loyalty
owed Villain’s victim (Parent’s child) or to avenge the wrong done Parent himself,
albeit derivatively. To be sure, we do not expect all readers or all citizens to agree
that each of these considerations underwrites a reason for Parent to kill Villain.

45

But we do expect most readers to recognize at least some of these as valid reasons
of nontrivial, perhaps substantial, weight.191
No doubt things are different when we introduce a working state with a
reasonably effective, if imperfect, system of criminal justice. In general, the
existence of the state likely strengthens some of the preexisting reasons, and adds
new ones, for Parent not to kill Villain. For example, there is a greatly increased
likelihood that retributivist, deterrent and incapacitative objectives will be served
even if Parent stays his hand. Additionally, the social costs of private vengeance
are greater if public order is already reasonably well maintained. So whether or
not it would have been wrongful for Parent to kill Villain in the absence of an
effective centralized enforcement system, it seems rather clearly wrongful under
contemporary developed conditions.
But we would caution against exaggerating the extent to which the
existence of a moderately effective state changes the moral terrain as it bears on
the present question. The state’s existence provides some new moral reasons for
Parent not to kill Villain and adds weight to preexisting reasons not to kill.192 It
might also displace or eliminate some reasons that would lend support to Parent
killing Villain. However we think it implausible that the presence of the state
extinguishes all the reasons that Parent would have had, absent the state, to kill
Villain. For one thing, law enforcement is far from perfect. Parent might
reasonably believe, and it might well be the case, that if he does not himself act,
Villain has a good chance of escaping capture, conviction, or punishment. If so,
Parent’s retributive and incapacitative reasons to kill that we previously invoked
would be preserved, if to attenuated degrees. Furthermore, any agent-relative
reasons Parent might have to act against Villain are likely to be similarly preserved
despite the existence of the state. Consider Stranger, who, like Parent, reasonably
believes Villain is unlikely to be caught or punished. Both Parent and Stranger
have (attenuated) reasons of incapacitation and retribution that lend support to
either of them killing Villain. But Parent has reasons for killing Villain that
Stranger does not share: to fulfill a duty of loyalty to Parent's child, or to avenge a
wrong done Parent himself, and so on. If Parent reasonably (and perhaps rightly)
believes that Villain would escape punishment by the state, not only are there
reasons for Parent to want Villain killed, but there are also reasons for Parent, and
not Stranger, to do the killing. In sum, then, while the existence of an effective
state surely affects the moral calculus, it is far from wholly transformative. If
Parent would have reasons to kill Villain sufficient to render his killing less
wrongful in the absence of an effective state, such reasons likely exist (in
weakened form) even in the world as we know it.
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2. Challenges.— The first possible challenge to this argument would reject
our general account of the determinants of the magnitude of wrongdoing. On the
competing view we have in mind, the degree to which a wrongful action is
wrongful is a function entirely of the wrongmaking reasons and not at all a
function of the delta—that is, the difference—between the wrongmaking reasons
and the putatively justifying ones. For example, homicide is more wrongful than
vandalism just because the reasons against killing a person are stronger than the
reasons against destroying somebody’s property. Reasons that tend in favor of an
action need not be considered at all if they are insufficient to render it permissible.
This alternative view is highly implausible. It seems plainly wrong if we
assume a consequentialist moral framework in which the right is a function of the
good and the good is determined entirely by aggregating states of affairs. But this
alternative view seems arbitrary and unmotivated even on nonconsequentialist
assumptions. Consider Slow Swimmer and Fast Swimmer, shipwrecked and
swimming for a plank that can accommodate only one. If Fast Swimmer reaches
the plank first (or looks poised to reach it first) and Slow Swimmer shoves him
aside, Slow Swimmer acts wrongfully on most moral views. (In Anglo-American
law, she would not be entitled to the justificatory defenses of self-defense,
necessity, or duress of circumstances.) But now consider Boater, floating by in a
skiff, who pushes Fast Swimmer off the plank because he wants the wood to make
picture frames and planters that he will sell at flea markets. We contend that
Boater is not merely more blameworthy than Slow Swimmer, but also that his
action is more wrongful. In these paired cases, however, the reasons against the
action are constant—namely, whatever reasons weigh against knowingly causing
the death of another human being. What distinguish the cases are the reasons for
which Slow Swimmer and Boater act. If Slow Swimmer’s act is less wrongful,
that lends substantial support for our claim that reasons that fall short of rendering
putatively wrongful action justified can nonetheless render it less wrongful.
The remaining challenges accept, at least arguendo, our general account of
degrees of wrongfulness—namely, that (perhaps loosely speaking) magnitude of
wrongdoing is a function of the delta between wrongmaking and supportive
reasons for action—but deny that any sort of provocation is adequate to supply an
actor with reason(s) to intentionally cause the death of another of a character and
force sufficient to (nontrivially) reduce the wrongfulness of the killing. First, one
could object that none of the putative reasons we invoked above, or any others, are
in fact good reasons to intentionally cause another’s death. Second, one could
contend that, insofar as they are good reasons, or would be under certain
assumptions, they are reasons that the provoker’s right to life excludes from
consideration.
We have little to say in response to the first of these two objections. While
we have already tried to present in a sympathetic light the reasons in favor of
Parent’s killing of Villain (reasons, it bears reiteration one last time, that are
defeated by the reasons against), we have also acknowledged that these claimed
reasons may not have merit under all moral theories and theories of value. And we
have further acknowledged that we don’t present arguments sufficient to establish
the case decisively if what we have said thus far does not resonate. We will add
only this. Imagine you learn that A, an acquaintance, has killed B. In response to
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your query or criticism, A says: “I had a reason. B killed my child.” “Still,” you
might say, “you ought not to have done it.” Or: “What you did was wrong.” The
instant question is whether you would go so far as to assert: “But that’s no reason
at all!” We expect that would be your response were A to have said: “I had a
reason. I hate black people” (or white people, or gay people, or tall people, or
people who listen to opera). That fact, you would say, might explain the killing
but is no reason for it. If you would find such a response appropriate in some
cases but not in the case of Parent and Villain, we suspect that is because you
recognize that the fact that Villain killed Parent’s child, while not itself precisely a
reason for Parent to kill Villain, does support such reasons and is therefore
telegraphic of them.
The second objection is slightly different. It allows that Parent has reasons
to kill Villain, perhaps reasons captured by the retributivist, deterrent,
incapacitative, and agent-relative considerations to which we have already alluded,
but claims that such reasons count among those that Villain’s right to life
specifically excludes. The “right to life,” the argument might go, captures what
Raz calls a “protected reason”—a first-order reason not to cause death backed or
reinforced by a second-order reason not to act on various first-order reasons that
might come into conflict with the possessor’s interests in life. The reasons that
would otherwise support Parent’s actions are excluded by the second-order reason.
But reasons grounded in promoting or protecting the lives of others are not
excluded. This is why Slow Swimmer’s killing of Fast Swimmer is less wrongful
than would be Boater’s killing of Fast Swimmer: the reasons supporting Slow
Swimmer’s action are precisely among those that Fast Swimmer’s right to life does
not exclude.
Possibly. Indeed, an argument that does not deny tout court that the
reasons Parent would invoke in support of his killing of Villain are good reasons,
but seeks instead to show why they are excluded from our practical reasoning by
the reasons that render killing wrongful in the first place, strikes us as the most
promising potential line of attack against our thesis. At present, though, we are not
persuaded. First, some of Parent’s reasons for killing Villain—those that sound in
deterring evildoers like him and in preventing Villain himself from harming other
innocents—would seem, on this competing account, not to be excluded from the
set of reasons that determine right conduct. Furthermore, vastly more argument is
needed to establish just what sorts of reasons are excluded by the protected reason
that corresponds to an individual’s supposed right to life. Equally or more
plausibly, it seems to us, is that the excluded reasons are limited to more quotidian
reasons for action like promoting the actor’s own pleasure and convenience, and
promoting ordinary welfare. That agent-relative reasons to avenge a grievous
wrong—reasons that might themselves plausibly be conceived as obligations of a
sort—are also excluded requires sustained argument, we think, and cannot be
merely asserted.
Those who argue that provoked killing is not less wrongful than a
paradigmatic murder bear the argumentative burden for another reason as well.
The case of Parent killing Villain establishes the intuitive (or perhaps prima facie)
appeal of the claim that an intentional killing provoked by a grievous wrong can be
less wrong than a typical murder. Those who reject our account of lesser wrongs
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must either contend that Parent’s conduct is just as wrong as that of the typical
murder, or provide an alternative explanation for why it is less wrong.
A final challenge, like the previous two, accepts our general account of
degrees of wrongdoing, but questions whether the requirement that the accused act
in a heat of passion precludes our reliance on this account of wrongdoing. If the
killer was too embroiled in anger to conform his behavior to the balance of
reasons, the objection would run, then he might seem unable to draw moral credit,
as it were, from the fact that reasons in fact existed to support (but not to fully
justify) his action. Put another way, the wrongfulness vel non of an action is not a
function solely of the guiding or true reasons that obtain, but on whether they are
explanatory reasons too—i.e., reasons that in fact explain why he acted. If this is
so, then the particular marriage of partial excuse and partial justification that we
seek to effectuate would be unworkable because the demands that the defendant
have some good reason to do as he did and that he was too engulfed by passion to
adhere to reason stand in a contradictory relationship.
This challenge evokes a debate in criminal law theory between proponents
of “subjective” and “objective” theories of justification, especially in the context of
what are often called “unknowing justifications.” Roughly, subjectivists about
justification believe that whether an actor is justified depends only upon whether
he nonculpably believed that facts existed which would support his violating a
criminal prohibition, as by using force against another; objectivists believe that the
validity of a justification depends only upon whether the facts did in fact exist. The
issue arises more commonly when an accused mistakenly believed that his life was
endangered (or that some other sort of important interest was threatened). The
“unknowing justification” variant arises when the converse is true: the actor is
unaware of facts that would unproblematically support a justification were the
actor to have been aware of them and to have acted (in some sense) because of
them. An example is the accused who attacks a seemingly innocent and
unthreatening person who, unbeknownst to the accused, was just about to attack
the accused or some innocent third party.
We say that this challenge evokes the subjective/objective debate over
justifications because the challenge would seem wholly to lack force against those
who adhere to the fully “objective” theory of justification in which justification
(full or partial) depends only upon the existence of guiding reasons. Be that as it
may, we are not objectivists about justification. We agree that reasons that are
grounded on facts of which the actor is unaware do not help to justify his action
against the wrong-making reasons of which he is aware.193 It may seem, then, that
this final challenge should worry us.
It does not. In cases of provocation, the killer is only too aware of the most
fundamental fact that gives birth to reasons to kill—namely, the wrong that his
victim has done him (or one close to him). Given his emotional state, the killer is
not likely to have immediate access to all the reasons themselves—reasons that we
have described by reference to the values of retribution, deterrence, loyalty, etc.
193

For arguments by one of us in support of that position, see Mitchell N. Berman, Lesser Evils and
Justification: A Less Close Look, 24 LAW & PHIL. 681 (2005).
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But unlike the paradigmatic putatively unknowingly justified actor, the provoked
killer is aware of the underlying facts. It’s just that, by hypothesis, he is not
consciously adverting to the good reasons that correspond to, or are grounded
upon, those facts. We do not believe that the subjectivist component to the correct
account of magnitude of wrongdoing properly requires that the actor consciously
advert to the reasons that bear on the gravity of his wrongdoing in just the way that
this objection contemplates. Rather, the reasons that serve to partially justify his
action are available to him, for purposes of assessing the magnitude of his
wrongdoing, so long as he is aware of the facts that underwrite those reasons, and
his awareness of those facts has the right sort of causal relationship to his action.
D. Final Observations
In this final section we develop two features of our analysis that the
particularly attentive reader might have inferred from the analysis to this point, but
warrant more explicit emphasis, lest they be missed.
1. The touchstone of adequate provocation.—Existing provocation doctrine
is mildly ambiguous regarding what the touchstone of adequate provocation is.
Most statutory provisions and commentators require that the provocation be such
as to cause a reasonable person to experience heat of passion.194 Others require
that the provocation must be adequate to provoke a reasonable man to action.195
Our account decouples the provocation and heat-of-passion requirements.
It would require that the defendant be in a heat of passion and that the provocation
be of the sort that gives the defendant reasons to kill (subject to a substantial
qualification discussed below). This is the more demanding test for provocation,
for while it is hard to imagine the cases in which provocation would satisfy that
standard yet not satisfy the orthodox one, the converse is not true. It seems that
many provocations might be adequate to cause an ordinary person to be enraged to
a degree in which the power of self-control is greatly impeded, yet which are
inadequate to furnish a genuine reason to kill the provoker.
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See, e.g., Georgia, GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-2 (provocation must be sufficient to incite
“irresistible passion” in a reasonable person); Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (provocation must be
“sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person”); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:31 (provocation must be “sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool
reflection”). LaFave declares, “It is sometimes stated that, in order to reduce an intentional killing
to voluntary manslaughter, the provocation involved much be such as to cause a reasonable man to
kill.” LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 777. He further says that, “Language to this effect
is to be found in many of the modern statutes.” Id. at 777 n. 14. We have found no language in the
statutes that refers to causing the reasonable man to kill. The closest are the statutes referred to
above which require that a reasonable man would have lost self-control or that the provocation
would have been “irresistible.”
195
Ashworth declares that the test of adequate provocation is “whether the provocation was
‘enough to make a reasonable person do as [the accused] did.” Ashworth, The Doctrine of
Provocation, supra note 3 at 298. Ashworth does not provide a cite for the claim in quotation
marks, but is presumably referring to s. 3 of the English Homicide Act, which provides: “Where on
a charge of murder there is evidence on which a jury can find that the person charged was provoked
… to lose self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable
person do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury.” The Homicide Act, §. 3, supra note
33 (emphasis added).
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On our account, then, manslaughter should probably be available in a
smaller class of cases than would be the case in jurisdictions that measure the
adequacy of provocation by its tendency to cause anger in a reasonable person.
But this would be so only when the nominal and actual sentencing range for
murder is broad and in which the sentencing authority (judge or jury) is willing to
grant the mitigation for murder that might often be due when loss of control is
present but a genuine reason to kill is absent. If intentional killers who do not
qualify for manslaughter cannot realistically get the mitigation that is due them,
then a more expansive manslaughter regime is justifiable as a second-best solution.
This follows from a point we have already tried to emphasize: the fact that an
intentional killer should not be entitled to the partial defense of manslaughter does
not, on our account, entail that he does not have a sound claim to be punished
less—even significantly less—than the paradigmatic or statistically ordinary
murderer.
2. Whether the accused must have reason “to kill.”—In presenting our
affirmative account, we exploited the example of a parent who (while in a heat of
passion) kills the murderer of her child. We claimed that the parent in fact has
reasons to kill. We contrasted this case with cases like Carr and Raguseo, in
which the killer plainly lacked any such reason. Admittedly, these examples
represent something close to the polar cases. More needs to be said about the
intermediate case in which the provoked killer has ample reason to do something
to his victim—let’s say, not putting a very fine point on it, that he has reason “to
retaliate”—but may not have reason to kill him. Consider Bully’s unprovoked
beating of Ordinary Joe, an assault that causes massive bleeding and broken bones,
but leaves Joe very much alive. If, after the assault is complete and without fear of
additional attack, but while still subject to the heat of passion, Joe stabs Bully in
the back, killing him, would he be entitled to provocation mitigation on our
analysis?
Perhaps this example is too thinly sketched to permit confident conclusions
regarding whether Joe had (some, but insufficient) reason to kill Bully, though we
think he did not and expect that most readers would share that judgment.
Whatever you might think about this particular case, we mean only to invite you to
imagine a case in which you would believe that the killer had reason to retaliate or
“to effect a punitive response,” but not reason to kill. It might seem to follow that,
on our account, Joe is not entitled to a manslaughter instruction on our account. In
fact, that does not necessarily follow. To understand why requires that we attend
more carefully than we have thus far to the act description killing.
Any bodily movement can be described under an innumerable number of
distinct act descriptions. One given act might answer to all of the following
descriptions: moving one’s index finger, firing a handgun, firing a Glock .45,
shooting at a person, killing, murdering, assassinating the president, etc. If I cause
the death of a pedestrian by driving when speeding, my action was wrong not
because it is wrong to kill a person, but because it is wrong to drive carelessly, or
recklessly, or too fast. When I try to justify my conduct by invoking my reason to
drive fast—say, I was rushing a gunshot victim to the hospital—the question is not
whether that need justifies killing someone, but whether it justifies driving fast (as

51

fast as I had been driving). The appropriate act description (putting negligence
aside) must be sensitive to what I took myself to be doing.
In the case of Parent and Villain, we have assumed that Parent acted with
intent to kill and we have argued that Parent had reason to do just that. In contrast,
we are assuming that Joe lacked reason to try to kill Bully. But—and here’s why
manslaughter might nonetheless still be available to him—Joe might not have had
any such intent. Surely in some homicide cases in which a defendant hopes for a
manslaughter conviction, his only intent was “to punish” the victim or “to teach
him a lesson” or “to hurt” him. The balance of reasons model we have employed
would seem to open up a sizeable space in which an actor has reason to act under a
description like this even when he would not have reason to act under the
description to kill. In some set of these cases, the accused would have reason to
act under the description to grievously harm while lacking reason to act under the
description to kill. Of course, under the common law and most current codes, the
intent to cause grievous bodily harm counts as “malice” and supports a murder
conviction when death results. There is some uncertainty regarding whether
provocation manslaughter is available when the (provable) intent is to cause
grievous bodily harm, but not to kill.196 A negative answer to that question, we
submit, is crazy. While it is a fallacy that the greater always or necessarily
includes the lesser, it usually does—or should. When the defendant did not intend
to kill but only intended to cause grievous bodily harm, and when the defendant
had reason to do the latter, but not to do the former, he should, on our analysis, be
entitled to the partial defense of provocation197—assuming, of course, that the heat
of passion prong is satisfied too.
CONCLUSION
The search for an explanation for the provocation defense has become
something of a cause célèbre among American criminal theorists over the last
quarter century. The primary focus of this search has been the question of how
provocation fits into the justification-excuse framework of criminal defenses. The
orthodox view is that provocation is a partial excuse. While some adherents of
partial excuse allow that the provoked killer’s anger may be justified, they deny
that the killing itself is even partially justified. One small camp of dissenting
196

Some modern statutes include language that appears to define provocation as requiring an intent
to kill. See, e.g., Indiana, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-3 (provocation applies to a person who “knowingly
or intentionally kills”); Kansas, KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3403 (provocation applies to an
“intentional killing of a human being”); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (provocation applies to a
person who “intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion”). Courts have
also often defined provocation “as if intent to kill were a required ingredient.” LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 33, at 776 and 776 n.3. Despite the presence of this restrictive language, the great
majority of jurisdictions allow a provocation defense in cases of intent to cause grievous bodily
harm, but not to kill. Id.
197
Say that intentionally injuring (X) is a lesser included offense of intentionally killing (Y). Now
consider three possibilities regarding when Y is partially justified: (1) if there are some (but
insufficient) reasons to Y; (2) if there are full and sufficient reasons to X, even if no reasons to Y;
and (3) if there are some (but insufficient) reasons to X, and no reasons to Y. We have defended
proposition (1). While we do not advocate proposition (2), our defense of (1) does not necessarily
exclude (2)—an approach with affinities to those advanced by Greenawalt and Rozelle.
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scholars argues that provocation is a partial justification. Another camp claims
that provocation is best understood as neither a justification nor an excuse.
None of these rationales provides a convincing explanation for the central
features of the provocation doctrine. Partial excuse theories can explain the heat of
passion requirement, but struggle to explain the adequate provocation requirement.
Partial justification theories have the opposite problem. We propose that
provocation is best explained as a combination of the two: the defense is limited to
intentional killings that are both partially excused and partially justified (or less
wrong, which comes to the same thing). This theory provides a natural
explanation for both the adequate provocation and heat of passion requirements. It
also explains why the provocation defense results in a lesser defense—
manslaughter—rather than merely a lower sentence.
We analyze partially justified actions as those supported by some
unexcluded reasons, but not supported by the balance of unexcluded reasons
bearing on that action. Scholars have traditionally resisted a combined partialexcuse/partial-justification rationale for provocation due to the long shadow cast
by two claims: the mutual exclusivity thesis and the claim that partial justification
is incoherent. We demonstrate that the mutual exclusivity thesis is wrong, at least
as it pertains to partial excuse and partial justification. We suggest that skepticism
of partial justification is overstated, but point out that, in any event, such
skepticism is negated by replacing “partial justification” with “less wrong.”
In sum, heat of passion and adequate provocation are necessary conditions
of provocation because the defense is limited to intentional killings that are less
wrong in virtue of the defendant’s reason for killing, and for which the defendant
is partially excused in virtue of his being in the thrall of strong emotions that
substantially impeded his ability to conform his conduct to what the balance of
reasons required.
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APPENDIX: SENTENCING RANGES FOR PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER AND
MURDER
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania*
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Provocation Manslaughter
2-20
< 20
3-12
3-20 (5 – 20 aggravated)
3, 6, or 11 years
3 – 6 (5 – 12 aggravated)
1-20, 5-20 (aggravated) 5-40 (with
firearm)
2-25
<15
<20
<20
<15
4-20 (called 2nd degree murder)
6-20 (20-50 with deadly weapon)
10
7.5-8.5 (truth in sentencing guidelines)
10-20
<40
<5 (<10 with firearm)
<20
<2.5 (<= life with infernal weapon)
<15
10
2-20
5-15
2-40
1-20
1-10
<30
5-10
6
5-25
3-9 (truth in sentencing)
<20 (lower grade of murder)
3-10
>4
<20
<20
<30
2-30
<= life
3-15
2-20 (“murder with mitigated
punishment”)
1-15
1-15
1-10
<= life
1-10
<60
<20
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Murder
10-99
20-99 (1st deg), 10-99 (2nd deg)
25 - Life (1st deg), 10-22 /16 (2nd)
10-life
25-life
Life
25-life
Life (1st deg), 10-life (2nd deg)
Life
Life
Life w/o parole (1st), life w/ parole
(2nd)
10-life
20-life
45-55, advisory 55, life possible
Life (1st), 25-50 (2nd)
Life (1st), 9-15 (2nd)
Life
Life w/o parole
25-life
Life (1st deg), 30 (2nd deg)
Life
Life
Life (1st deg), <40 (2nd), <25 (3rd)
Life
10-life
10-100
Life w/o parole (1st), life w/ parole
(2nd)
st
20-life (1 deg), 10-life (2nd deg)
Life
30-life
15-life
25-life (1st deg), 15-life (2nd deg)
10-life
30-life
15-life
Life w/o parole (1st), 10-life (2nd)
25-life
Life (1st & 2nd), <40 (3rd)
Life (1st deg), 10-life (2nd)
30-life
Not less than life
Life (1st), 15-life (2nd)
5-99
5-life
35-life (1st deg), 20-life(2nd)
20-life
Life
Life (1st), 10-40 (2nd)
Life (1st), <60 (2nd)
Life (1st), 20-life (2nd)

